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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three essays that investigate topics in corporate finance and
applied Econometrics.
The first essay examines how digital credit, a Fintech technology, improves microbusiness owners' performance by comparing an economically important but often financially
disadvantaged group, migrants, with their comparable natives. Using the data on micro-business
owners registered with the largest Fintech firm in China, we find that with the access to
microloans, migrants achieve greater business revenues compared to their native counterparts.
The differential impact of Fintech on migrants versus natives is more pronounced in the
businesses with more financial constraints, in more economically developed areas, for more risk
averse business owners, and among the owners who are relatively new to the Fintech platform.
Overall, our findings support that Fintech improves financial access and business performance for
the financially excluded population.
The second essay applies factor model into selecting a subset of assets for (partial) index
replication, based on the latest research on factor models of large dimensions. Our method
automates the asset selection process and reduces cost for passive fund managers who finds full
replication infeasible or too costly. Our selection methodology is consistent as the sample size
and the number of assets jointly approach infinity. Monte Carlo experiments show that our
estimated index replica tracks the underlying index with relatively small tracking errors in finite
samples. We show the applicability of the method by tracking the S&P 500 equally weighed
index and the MSCI USA Small Cap index with promising out-of-sample performance.
The third essay explores another application of factor model on price discovery. We
investigate how market completeness influences the price discovery process in the option market,
by studying how the introduction of new option contracts on the S&P 500 index has changed the
iii

distribution of information content among all S&P500 index options. Using a novel
methodology, we quantify the daily contribution of an individual option contract to price
discovery. Our results show dramatic changes during the sample period between 2004 and 2018.
We document an important shift in price discovery from call to put options, and from long-term
contracts to short-term contracts. Our results also suggest that due to market frictions, market
completion does not immediately lead to changes in information shares.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
This dissertation involves two general topics, corporate finance and applied Econometrics.
Essay One covers the corporate finance topic. We examine the impact of Fintech on small
business performance for underserviced population. This is important because first, Fintech itself
has been drawing tremendous interest such that it is now one of the fastest growing research
topics on SSRN (Goldstein et al, 2019), and more importantly, literature has not yet come to a
conclusion on whether FinTech indeed helps less financially included population. On one hand,
Demir et al. (2020)’s cross-country study shows that Fintech facilitates financial inclusion. On the
other hand, evidence from Fuster et al. (2019) on mortgage lending and from Tang (2019) on
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending both report lack of evidence that borrowers with low access to
traditional finance ever benefits from Fintech.
Adding to this inconclusive literature, we find evidence that digital credit helps the group
with less financial access (represented by migrant population in our sample) achieve better
business performance. We differentiate from the existing studies in that the specific type of
Fintech we investigate is digital credit. This matters because digital credit not only shares the
common features for Fintech products (i.e., instant, automated and remote), but also holds unique
potential in lowering information asymmetry especially for borrowers traditionally more
financially excluded (see Section 2.3 for elaboration). The key to the big unsolved question in the
literature could lie in how the question is raised: instead of whether Fintech helps, maybe we
should ask which Fintech helps. It is beyond the scope of our study to prove this point, but we
contribute to the discussion by adding our piece of evidence into this stream of literature.
Specifically, in Essay One we use the data on micro-business owners registered with the
1

largest Fintech firm in China that includes identifier for migrants and natives, using and not using
digital credit. We find that with the access to digital credit, migrants achieve greater business
revenues compared to their native counterparts. The differential impact of Fintech on migrants
versus natives is more pronounced in the businesses with more financial constraints, in more
economically developed areas, for more risk averse business owners, and among the owners who
are relatively new to the Fintech platform. Overall, our findings support that Fintech improves
financial access and business performance for the financially excluded population.
The second topic, applied Econometrics, is explored in Essay Two and Essay Three. In
both papers, we apply the latest Econometrics research on factor models of large dimensions to
finance research questions.
The elegance of the factor model, the specific Econometrics applied here, lies in its
simplicity as well as its applicability to big data. Essay Two shows its edge in simplicity: it
enables an automated asset-selection process for partial index replication that shows effectivity
without the burden of prohibiting amount of calculation. Essay Three demonstrates its advantage
in applicability to big data: it enables the information share calculation for huge number of
contracts (thousands per day) that is infeasible in the classic Hasbrouck (1995) information share
calculation, and thus opens the door for price discovery research in option panels. Both Essays
show the expansion of possibilities in finance research with the help of Econometrics
advancement.
Essay Two proposes a new methodology to select a subset of assets for (partial) index
replication, based on the latest research on factor models of large dimensions. Partial index
replication is commonly used in practice, as not all indexes can be easily replicated by trading all
its component assets without suffering from high transaction and liquidity costs (one example is
the Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF, ticker VTI). The rising trend of passively managed funds
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(such as ETFs) further adds to the empirical relevance of this topic.
The index tracking problem can be divided into two parts: 1) selection of the set of assets
to be included in the tracking portfolio and 2) estimation of the asset weights in the tracking
portfolio. The majority of the literature has focused on the second problem only, and relatively
less attention has been given to the asset selection problem (see Section 3.2.1 for detailed
literature review), which we focus on in our study.
We build on and improves the factor-based approach in Corielli and Marcellino (2006) by
adapting a formal approach in Parker and Sul (2016) into index tracking context, yielding lower
parameter sensitivity and higher computational efficiency. Our selection methodology is
consistent as the sample size and the number of assets jointly approach infinity. Monte Carlo
experiments show that our estimated index replica tracks the underlying index with relatively
small tracking errors in finite samples. We show the applicability of the method by tracking the
S&P 500 equally weighed index and the MSCI USA Small Cap index with promising out-ofsample performance.
Essay Three investigates how market completeness influences the price discovery process
in the option market. The classic price discovery question involving options market investigates
whether options market contribute to the price discovery of the underlying assets (such as stocks).
Literature has generally agreed that options market matters and does contribute to the price
discovery process of the underlying (see Section 4.1 for a literature review). We build on this
existing finding and further ask which type of options contributes more to the price discovery
process and how introduction of new contracts changes this process.
The research question requires a technique that allows comparison in relative information
contribution across thousands of options contracts listed every single day. This large dimension
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nature makes the classic Hasbrouck (1995) information share approach infeasible for the purpose
of this research. We adapt the factor-based approach in Westerlund et al. (2017) to options price
discovery context to enable the information share calculation across the large-dimension option
panel.
Specifically, we study how the introduction of new option contracts on the S&P 500 index
has changed the way this option market incorporates new information. Using this factor-based
methodology, we quantify the daily contribution of an individual option contract to price
discovery. Our results show dramatic changes during the sample period between 2004 and 2018.
We document an important shift in price discovery from call to put options, and from long-term
contracts to short-term contracts. Our results also suggest that due to market frictions, market
completion does not immediately lead to changes in information shares
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Chapter 2: Essay One

Effect of Digital Credit on Small Business Performance: Migrants versus Natives

6

Abstract
This study examines the impact of digital credit on micro-business owners'
performance. Using the data on business owners registered with the largest Fintech firm in
China, we find that with the access to Fintech microloans, migrants (who are often financially
disadvantaged and excluded) achieve greater business revenues compared to their native
counterparts. The differential impact of Fintech on migrants versus natives is more pronounced
in the businesses with more financial constraints, in more economically developed areas, for
more risk averse business owners, and among the owners who are relatively new to the Fintech
platform. Overall, our findings support that Fintech improves financial access and business
performance for the financially excluded population. Importantly, our result also provides
suggestive implication for Fintech reducing income gap between native and migrant
microentrepreneurs.

Keywords: Fintech, digital credit, microfinance, migrant, income inequality
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2.1

Introduction

Financial technology (Fintech) significantly transforms the way financial services are
conducted.1 As young start-ups and established technology firms introduce new technology
into the financial industry, the incumbents are disrupted and so are the traditional financial
services. A natural question thus arises: how does Fintech impact the financial market and its
players? More specifically, does Fintech serve as a complement to the traditional financial
services and make finance more accessible to those who are originally excluded from the
traditional financial market?
The literature on whether Fintech improves financial access for those who are
disadvantaged in the traditional financial market remains mixed. Some Fintech literature fails
to find the evidence that Fintech improves financial access. For example, in Fuster et al.
(2019), Fintech lenders in mortgage lending are faster in processing applications; however,
there is no evidence that these Fintech lenders target borrowers with low access to traditional
finance. Similarly, Tang (2019) finds that peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is a substitute for bank
lending rather than a complement, and the credit expansion from P2P lending occurs only
among borrowers who already have access to bank credit. The above results seem at odds with
the expectation for Fintech, given the background that Fintech rises after the 2008 financial
crisis by filling in the market demand for low-income individuals and businesses who find it
increasingly difficult to obtain loans from the traditional banking sector.
In contrast, both the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and

The term “Fintech” refers to using data generated from online platforms or mobile apps to improve financial
services.
1
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the G20 High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion highlight the importance of
harnessing Fintech to reduce financial exclusion. 2 Financial market imperfections such as
information asymmetries and transaction costs hinder financially disadvantaged people from
escaping poverty (Galor and Zeira, 1993). As a result, theoretically, Fintech, through reducing
market imperfections, allows the disadvantaged group to access the financial market that is
traditionally not accessible to them. Empirically, Demir et al. (2020) find the cross-country
evidence that Fintech facilitates financial inclusion and reduces income inequality.
The above mixed evidence on whether Fintech improves financial access thus warrants
investigating the role of Fintech in the under-serviced population. In this paper, we examine
the differential impact of digital credit on small business performance between migrant versus
native microentrepreneurs. Migrants are often financially disadvantaged and excluded
compared to native citizens.3 For example, existing studies show that migrant workers suffer
substantial discrimination in labor market (Friedman and Lee, 2010) and have lower average
income (Knigh et al., 2010, Meng and Bai, 2007). Using the data from China, Li (2010) and
Wang and Tian (2013) find that migrants' lower socioeconomic status together with the
household registration restrictions creates barriers for migrants to access financial services in
China, such as obtaining a mortgage. As what will be elaborated in Section 2.3.2, traditional

2

See UNSGSA: Igniting SDG Progress Through Digital Financial Inclusion:
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=2655&menu=1515
and G20 High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion:
https://www.gpfi.org/publications/g20-high-level-principles-digital-financial-inclusion
3
This paper uses the data on migrants who move across different regions within China. Different from the
migrants who move from China to other countries, the migrants moving within China are typically poorer and
less privileged. Also slightly different from the typical understanding in North America where migrants are
perceived as people who have moved from one place to another, migrants in China still have their house
registered in the old place, though they spend most of the time living in the new place.
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banking typically copes with information asymmetry by collecting financial statements,
collateral or soft information, and migrants with low socioeconomic status typically find it
hard to provide these information (e.g., migrant street vendors using cash transaction cannot
provide financial records to show credit history; migrants’ property in their hometown cannot
serve as collateral in the destination city while that of the natives’ can). We argue that digital
credit for small business owners reduces the obstacle to migrants' access to the financial
market. Increased accessibility then improves business performance more for the financially
excluded population (migrants) than the financially included population (natives), thereby
narrowing the performance gap between migrants and their native counterparts.
To examine the above hypothesis, we compare the impact of digital credit on business
revenues for migrants with that for natives. Our main finding is that migrant business owners
with the access to digital loans harvest more revenues compared to their native counterparts.
Digital credit benefits migrants more than it does for natives because Fintech reduces the
obstacle resulting from financial exclusion to migrants while such an obstacle is likely not
existing among native business owners. We quantify the incremental benefit gained by
migrants (relative to native entrepreneurs) from using Fintech loans to be 10%, which is
economically significant. Our results thus provide empirical evidence that Fintech plays an
important role in reaching and helping disadvantaged groups such as migrants.
Next, we conduct heterogeneity analysis and find that the additional benefit migrants
receive from Fintech loans is more prominent among microentrepreneurs with more financial
constraint. This is consistent with that financial services are more likely to benefit the
individuals who would otherwise have no access to those services (for example, more
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financially constrained people) (Beck et al., 2007). We then divide our sample based on
economic development levels and find that the effect of migrants obtaining incremental benefit
relative to natives after drawing a Fintech microloan is only present in more developed cities
or regions. More economically developed areas possibly have a larger migrant-native gap in
financial access, and thus the disadvantaged migrants are more likely to gain from Fintech
loans.
We further split the sample by individual business owners' risk attitude, as proxied by
gender and age. We find that the performance enhancing effect on migrants only exists in the
more risk-averse subsamples, namely female and older entrepreneurs. Risk-averse
entrepreneurs benefit more significantly from Fintech possibly because they are less likely
than risk-seeking individuals to seek financing from other risky funding sources such as P2P
platforms and are more likely to be underserviced financially ex ante. We finally divide the
sample based on signup months for the Fintech platform, and find that the effect only holds
for newer users. A business generally follows a life-cycle trajectory from origin to maturity,
associated with shrinking investment opportunities and decreasing cost of raising external
capital (Bulan and Subramanian, 2011). Thus, external financing resources such as Fintech
loans are more relevant for new businesses and the impact of Fintech is more prominent among
newly registered microentrepreneurs.
To summarize, our paper adds to the growing body of the literature on the inclusive
role of Fintech, and provides the evidence that digital loans improve financial access of the
ex-ante excluded players. Financial inclusion reduces the disparity between migrant and native
entrepreneurs, leading to a higher degree of equality and integration for existing migrants and
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providing a catalyst for potential future migration and urbanization. Given that migration and
inequality faced by migrants in destination cities are a global phenomenon, the implication of
our research, even if based on the China data, goes beyond the scope of China.
2.2

Literature Review and Contributions

Our paper is related to four strands of literature: traditional non-Fintech based microfinance,
Fintech in general and digital credit specifically, migration, and income equality.
Microfinance is financial services targeting individuals and small businesses that lack
access to conventional banking and related services. Microfinance may help reduce income
inequality between those that have access to conventional financial services and those that do
not. Empirical evidence on this income effect is mixed. Supporting evidence is found in crosscountry studies where countries with higher participation of microfinance witness lower
income inequality (Hermes 2014; Lacalle-Calderon et al. 2019). However, micro-level studies
using randomized controlled trials (RCT) in a few countries fail to find a positive impact of
microcredit participation on household income (Angelucci et al., 2015; Attanasio et al., 2015;
Augsburg et al., 2015; Crepon et al., 2015; Tarozzi et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2015a, 2015b).
Due to the local rather than the general effect, Morduch (2020) questions the validity of
generalizing the results from the above RCT studies. On the other hand, the RCT studies do
provide evidence that expanded access to credit increases business activities, as measured by
revenues and/or expenses (Banerjee et al., 2015b).
Recent years have seen a growing body of literature on Fintech. Pertinent to the
background topic of this paper, some studies have raised questions whether Fintech does
complement traditional finance. For example, Fuster et al. (2019) study the U.S. mortgage
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market where Fintech lenders are defined as any lender who offers an application process that
can be completed entirely online. They find that Fintech lenders process applications 20%
faster and are less likely to incur bottlenecks upon demand shocks. They also find that Fintech
lenders do not target borrowers with low access to traditional finance, suggesting that these
lenders are mostly competing with the traditional mortgage lenders rather than broadening
access. This view is confirmed by Tang (2019) and Vallee and Zeng (2019), who provide
further evidence from peer-to-peer (P2P) lending that Fintech lending is only accessed by
borrowers who already have access to bank credit. We add to the Fintech literature by
contributing to the ongoing debate on whether Fintech helps under-serviced group; we provide
new evidence that Fintech loans benefit micro-business owners who may have limited access
to other means of financing.
Our paper is specifically related to digital credit, a special form of Fintech. The
literature on consumer digital credit find that digital loans raise household resilience to
financial shocks (Bharadwaj et al., 2019). However, the high interest rate on digital loans may
cause difficulty in paying bills (Melzer, 2011) and over-indebtedness and bankruptcy (Skiba
and Tobacman, 2019). In addition to consumer credit products, business loans in digital forms
are growing recently. Hau et al. (2019)'s theoretical framework predicts that the share of
borrowers using the digital credit decreases in the credit scores, implying that digital loans
particularly serve low-credit borrowers. They then use China data and provide the evidence
that compared to traditional bank loans, Fintech credit expands the financing to micro-business
borrowers (specifically Taobao vendors) of lower credit scores, and thus benefits more
businesses. Frost et al. (2019) investigate the development of Fintech credit in Argentina and
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find that compared to the traditional credit rating service, credit scoring techniques based on
big data and machine learning provide a better prediction of loss rates of small businesses.
Chen et al. (2021) use Alibaba's data and find that credit access significantly reduces the
volatility in firm sales. In sum, we add to this literature by investigating differential impacts
of digital business credit on migrant versus native business owners.
The research on migrants generally focuses on the migration decision of the labor force
and the well-being of the migrant households. Migration results in labor force reallocation and
improves economic efficiency. Based on Ratha et al. (2011), migration often happens for
economic reasons. Labor tends to move from geographical areas or industry sectors with lower
returns of labor to those with higher returns, improving the overall efficiency as well as
reducing income inequality among people who are originally from different regions. Hao et
al. (2020), for example, use the data from China and show that migration-induced labor
reallocation plays a central role in the country's aggregate income growth and regional income
convergence.
Although the literature on migration is large, not much focuses on how financial
markets and Fintech impact migration and the welfare of migrants. Datta (2009) investigates
financial exclusions faced by low-paid migrant workers. Jack and Suri (2016) list the reduction
of transaction costs of long-distance urban-to-rural remittances as one of the potential channels
for lowering extreme poverty and expanding migration to higher- return labor markets.
Anderloni and Vandone (2007) analyze migrants' demand for financial services and call for
financial innovation to satisfy such demand. Albareto and Mistrulli (2011) find that migrants
pay, on average, almost 70 basis points higher for credit than natives do. Lee et al. (2021) find
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that when mobile banking is introduced to poor rural households and their family members
who migrate to larger cities in Bangladesh, rural consumption increases and extreme poverty
falls. In our paper, we investigate whether urban migrants benefit from the development of
Fintech, through the channels other than lower remittance transaction cost. Specifically, we
extend this literature by examining how Fintech innovations affect the business performance
of migrants compared to that of their native counterparts in the same city. Our results that
Fintech credit improves migrants' business performance more than it does natives' have
important economic implications that migration, combined with Fintech, improves economic
efficiency.
Lastly, our paper contributes to the literature on the effect of finance on inequality.
Recently, Fintech-enabled innovations that provide more inclusive services to unprivileged
people (e.g., the unbanked low-income households) are receiving increasing attention. Beck
et al. (2007) distinguish between the effect of finance on the extensive margin and that on the
intensive margin. The extensive margin is to extend the financial services to the individuals
who would otherwise have no access to those services. The extensive margin thus benefits the
disadvantaged group and decreases the inequality (Beck et al., 2007). The intensive margin is
to improve the quality and the range of financial services enjoyed by those already purchasing
financial services (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). This tends to widen the inequality. Our
research focuses on the extensive margin and the result suggests that Fintech, acting as a more
inclusive form of finance to migrants, reduce disparity between migrants and natives.
2.3

Digital Credit

2.3.1 Institutional Background
This section provides institutional background on Ant Group, our data provider, and its digital
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loan products. Ant Group is known as the digital finance arm of Alibaba, and its best-known
product, Alipay, is a leading third-party payment system, with a 55% market share in China.
Our data come from the transaction records of Alipay users' accounts. The Fintech business
loans considered in the paper are provided by Ant Group's affiliate, MyBank, an online bank
that focuses on small business loans and is rapidly expanding since its incorporation in June
2015. The average loan balance per borrower doubles from Chinese yuan 15,000 (equivalent
to US $2,160) in 2016 to Chinese yuan 31,000 (US $4,453) in 2019. 4 The loan products
support over 20 million small and micro businesses as of 2019, up from 2.77 million borrowers
in 2016. The non-performing loan ratio (the amount of loans in default to the total amount of
outstanding loans a bank holds) to small and medium-sized businesses has consistently been
at around 1%, significantly lower than the industry average of 3.22% in 2019.5 Given Alipay's
leading market share and MyBank's broad coverage of borrowers, the sample data we obtain
from Ant Group is a reasonable representation of the Fintech loan market in China.
The business microloans offered by MyBank have the features of a typical digital
credit product: instant, automated, and remote (Chen and Mazer, 2016). It is almost
instantaneous from loan application through approval, with a 3-minute application and nearly
0-second approval. The evaluation of loan applications is automated with big data technology
accomplishing the screening instead of relying on human judgement. Finally, the entire

4

The currency conversion is based on the year-end exchange rates on Federal Reserve's Foreign Exchange
Rates H.10.
5
The data is from two articles titled “2017 Results of Ant's MyBank”
(https://chinatechecon.wordpress.com/tag/zhejiang-e-commerce-bank/), and “MyBank Served Over 20 Million
SMEs as of 2019, Further Spurring the Growth of China's Small and Micro Businesses
(https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200427005353/en/MYbank-Served-20-Million-SMEs-2019Spurring).
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process of loan application, approval, and payments is done online without the need of visiting
a branch or agent in person.
In addition, MyBank business microloans also feature zero requirement on collateral
and almost no entry bar on loan amount (which can be as low as only ￥1 or $0.15).
2.3.2 Traditional Banking versus Digital Credit
The information asymmetry problem faced by traditional financial intermediaries leads to
financial exclusion for smaller businesses and unprivileged entrepreneurs. Existing theories
suggest that financial market imperfections such as information asymmetry prevent poor
people from escaping poverty by limiting their access to formal financial services, and thus
new financial technologies become important tools to enable financial inclusion (Demir et al.,
2020; Galor and Zeira, 1993).
Traditional banking relies on three main means to reduce information asymmetry:
financial statements, collateral, and soft information collection (Figure 1 Panel A). First,
financial data provided by smaller businesses may not be credible or have enough profit years
that would warrant a loan. Second, entrepreneurs with more endowment, such as real estate,
vehicles, and parental wealth, can more easily provide collateral for loans. Migrant
entrepreneurs of small businesses investigated in this paper, in contrast, are less able to do so
because they are often born in a less wealthy family or face government restrictions in buying
real estate in cities that they are not originally from. Third, soft information is collected through
frequent personal contacts between the borrower and the loan officer. This process of
relationship building requires time and effort, and borrowers from small businesses lack the
resources (e.g., connection, special manpower in public relations, etc.) to engage in
17

relationship building. Taken together, in the traditional banking system, financial resources
are more likely to be allocated to larger firms and financially sound entrepreneurs, thereby
widening the inequality in economic opportunities.
[Figure 1 here]
Digital finance, nevertheless, resolves the above information problem and thus offers
more equal economic opportunities than the traditional banking system does (Bharadwaj et al.,
2019). As shown in Figure 1 Panel B, besides financial statements, Fintech firms have a large
dataset of their users' daily transactions, which provide detailed information on a company's
operating performance. From the historical transaction data, the Fintech firm can infer about
the user's behavioral attributes on its willingness and ability to repay a loan. As a result,
collateral often becomes unnecessary in Fintech loans due to the rich information generated
from big data, and thus Fintech loans are more accessible to entrepreneurs without much
endowment. In addition, with Fintech, the marginal cost of dispersing a digital loan to an
additional user is nearly zero (Bjorkegren and Grissen 2018). Fintech thus permits smaller and
cheaper loans in a larger scale than any traditional financial intermediaries can do.
Furthermore, Fintech clients' hard information is automatically generated on a daily basis and
their soft information is hardened through models and machines rather than humans. Hence,
under the Fintech platform, all businesses and entrepreneurs are treated equally and smaller
businesses are no longer disadvantaged due to potential lack of connections with banks.
Overall, Fintech improves data quality and lowers data collection cost, thus reducing
information cost for smaller businesses and migrant entrepreneurs who otherwise have
asymmetric information problems. Digital finance, as a result, offers more equal economic
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opportunities for unprivileged groups. All features of digital finance discussed in this section
apply to the MyBank loan product investigated in our data.
2.4 Data and Main Variables
Our data is provided by Ant Group and covers 167,268 active individual business owners from
January 2017 to July 2019. The data is anonymous and desensitized to preserve confidentiality.
This dataset provides a rich array of variables, including each individual business owner's
monthly operating performance, indicator variables on whether the business owners draw
business loans each month, whether a business owner is a migrant or a native, and whether a
business owner conducts the business online on the Taobao platform or offline using a QR
code to receive payments. Other individual-level information includes the individual'
demographics, residential city, the industry that the business is in, etc. City level variables
include the level of city development and various indexes measuring a city's mobile payment
penetration.
Ant Group provides us with a random draw of its users based on the following criteria.
First, we require that the sample includes only the individuals who register their businesses
using their personal identification information instead of corporate information. This screening
condition enables us to use the personal identification information to determine whether a
micro-business owner is a migrant or a native. Second, we require that the sample individuals
be active users of Alipay, specifically having at least six-month consecutive transaction
records in Alipay's database by the end of 2018. Inactive users are likely to be consumers
rather than business owners who use Alipay accounts for business operations. Anyone can
apply for a personal QR code and use it for money transfer among friends and relatives. These
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non-commercial transactions probably happen only occasionally or irregularly and hence the
criterion we impose helps filter out non-business users. The resulting random sample based on
the criteria above includes about 167 thousand users and 4 million user-month observations.
The main dependent variable of the paper is the logarithm of monthly revenue of
individual business owners. This is the sum of the money inflow into an Alipay user's account
from transactions (not from loans) each month. Although these micro-business owners may
have income sources other than their owned business, the difference of the above revenue
variable between migrant and native business owners could imply whether the gap in income
through the Alipay platform widens or narrows. Two other performance measures, the number
of transactions and the number of unique customers each month, can also help us gauge how
well the business is performing. Due to the right skewness, all the three operating performance
variables are winsorized at the 99% level.
To compare migrants and natives, we define the indicator variable, Migrant, to be equal
to one if the business owner is a migrant and zero otherwise. We identify an individual as a
migrant if he/she resides in a province different from the one where he/she was born 6. We then
define the indicator variable DrawLoan to be one if the business owner draws a business loan
during the month, and zero otherwise.7
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables included in the dataset.
The monthly revenue (revenue), has a median of Chinese yuan 5,253.00 (US $764.02), much

Ideally, a person would be considered a migrant if her/his household is registered in one place but live in
another place. However, since our data provider cannot observe users’ current household registration
information, the birth province is used here as an approximation. Potential limitation of using this
approximation is discussed in Section 2.6.
7
Due to confidentiality reason, the data does not permit us to obtain details about the loan amount, interest rate,
duration, covenants, etc.
6
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smaller than its mean Chinese yuan 27,329.35 (US $3,974.89), indicating right skewness. The
small dollar value of the revenue confirms that the typical sample business owner is a microbusiness owner. The average Migrant indicator, 0.27, shows that three out of ten business
owners are migrants. One out of four business owners operates an online store (with the online
seller indicator, Taobao_seller, being equal to one) and 88% business owners accept QR code
payments (QR-code business owner indicator, IsQRcode, is one). The prevalence of QR-code
business owners is not surprising due to the low cost and low technology barrier of QR codes.
Even very small street vendors who do not own a computer or do not know anything about
webpage design can easily apply for a QR code with a mobile phone and use it to receive
payments for their businesses.
The business owners in the sample have a median age of 34. The median gender is 1,
meaning that the typical sample business owner is male. The medians of Child_score,
RealEstate, and Marriage are 0.68, 0.57, and 0.66, suggesting that the sample business owners'
probabilities of having at least a child, owning a real property, and being married are more
than half. The average DrawLoan is 0.13. That is, 13% of the monthly sample observations
have loans being drawn, roughly indicating that a representative business owner draws
microloans once or twice per year. We provide the detailed definitions of all the variables in
Appendix Table A1.
[Table 1 here]
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Effect of Digital Credit on Business Performance
2.5.1.1 Empirical Model
To gauge the differential effect of Fintech loans on migrant business owners' performance
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versus their native counterparts, we run the following regression:
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) = 𝑏1 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑏2 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐴𝑐 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

(1)

where 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the revenue received from business transactions by business owner 𝑖 in
month 𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an indicator variable on whether business owner 𝑖 is a migrant who
works in a province different from where she was born, and 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator
variable showing whether business owner 𝑖 draws loan credit in month 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 refer to
the control variables, including the degree of city development, city-level GDP per capita in
logarithm and a set of user characteristics. These characteristics include online-business
owner indicator, QR-code business owner indicator, farm-loan user indicator, gender, age,
squared age, probability of being married, probability of having children, probability of
owning real estate, non-missing education indicator, occupation dummies, industry
dummies, and the number of months since the entrepreneur first signs up with Alipay. We
also control for city fixed effects 𝐴𝑐 and month fixed effects 𝐵𝑡 .
In this regression, the primary coefficient of interest is 𝑏3 . If Fintech microloans benefit
migrants more than natives, we expect to see 𝑏3 being positive and significant.
2.5.1.2 Matching
To provide a comparable basis for the analysis, the regression is run on a matched sample of
migrant and native business owners who are similar in observable dimensions except for
whether they are migrants. This is to remove any potential pre-treatment differences between
migrants and natives.
The detailed steps of constructing the matching sample are as follows. Our sample
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begins in January 2017, and we match using the information from March to May of 2017. We
do not use January or February of 2017 for matching to avoid the impact of seasonal effect
from migrants' massive Spring Festival hometown-returning effect in China. We remove the
business owners who register with Alipay but have not been operating, by keeping only
business owners who have monthly revenues greater than Chinese yuan 1.00 (US $0.15) for
all the 31 months (January 2017 - July 2019) in our sample. We also restrict our sample to the
cities with a higher economic development level because most migrants reside in such cities.
The data provider, Ant Group, classifies all the cities into six levels based on economic
development, with the level 1 being the most developed (e.g., Beijing and Shanghai) and the
level 6 the least developed. About 90% of the migrants and 67% of the natives in the sample
are located in the cities with the levels of 1-3.8 We constrain the sample to include only the
business owners in the cities with levels 1-3. Migrants who move to larger cities (as opposed
to smaller ones) are those who are possibly disadvantaged and financially excluded compared
to their native counterpart from the same destination cities and thus are of our interest. In
matching, we only use individuals who do not draw any loans during the matching period of
March to May of 2017. This is to ensure that migrants and natives are similar ex ante, i.e.,
before Fintech loans start to play a role.
Next, for each migrant, we find candidate matches of natives in the same city, same
month, same industry, same education level, similar age.9 We then require that the migrant

8

The distribution of natives across the cities with different development levels (from most to least developed)
are 7.9%, 25.7%, 33.6%, 21.1%, 10.2%, and 1.6%, and the distribution of migrants are 28.3%, 36.3%, 25.4%,
5.3%, 4.0%, and 0.8%. The statistics show that migrants tend to move from less developed areas to more
developed areas and that there is a disproportionally high fraction of migrants in the largest cities in China.
9
To increase the possibility of getting a match, based on the industry information provided in the dataset, we do
a 4-category industry classification: retail, catering, other services, and the remaining industries, which accounts
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and potential native matches have similar performance. To gauge the closeness in
performance, we require that the natives have the revenue in each month of the matching
window of March to May 2017 being within ±10% of the migrant' revenue during the same
month, have the one-month revenue growth during the matching window (i.e., growth from
March to April and growth from April to May 2017) within ±30% that of the migrant's during
the same period, and have the two-month growth rate (i.e., two-month growth from March to
May 2017) within ±40% that of the migrant's during the same period. We further require that
the difference in the number of customers between the migrant and the matched native is less
than the standard deviation of the number of customers in the full sample, which is 392. If
there are multiple matched natives to one migrant after the above steps, we keep only the
closest native match based on the Euclidean distance of the migrant's and the native's onemonth revenue growth rates from March to April and from April to May 2017.
We do a balance test to investigate whether migrant business owners and their matched
natives are comparable in the observable dimensions. Panel A of Table 2 shows the summary
statistics for migrants and natives on various characteristics during the matching period of
March to May 2017. These characteristics include business performance, business owner
types, and demographics. The difference is insignificant at the 5% level for all variables. Only
two variables, the revenue in March 2017 and the revenue growth from March to April in

for 40.6%, 32.5%, 10.6% and 16.4% of the observations in the full sample. In addition, when the education
variable is missing, the individual is matched with one also with missing education. Finally, although we constrain
the age difference between migrants and natives to be less than or equal to 30 to increase the likelihood of
matching (the entire sample has a mean age of 36 and a standard deviation of 9 years), the age difference between
the final migrant and matched samples is only 0.4 year and insignificant.
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2017, are significantly different at 10% level between migrants and natives. However, the
magnitude of the difference is modest; the revenue difference in March 2017 is Chinese yuan
385.52 (US $56.01 based on March 31, 2017 exchange rate) or 0.5% of the average revenue
of the sample, and the one-month revenue growth rate difference is -1.01%. Overall, we
conclude that the migrants and the matched natives are similar at the beginning of our sample
period.
We then conduct a sample representative analysis to check whether the matched
sample is comparable to the original full sample. Panel B of Table 2 compares summary
statistics of the variables used in the regressions, between the full sample and the matched
sample. The statistics are similar on demographic variables, but different on business- related
variables. Specifically, the businesses in the matched sample generally perform better than
those in the full sample. For example, the summary statistics of operating performance
variables, such as revenues, number of transactions, number of customers, are much larger in
the matched sample than those in the full sample. In addition, the matched sample includes a
larger proportion of micro-businesses that operate online (which are generally larger
businesses) and a lower proportion of businesses using QR moneyreceiving code (i.e., smaller
businesses). The average micro-businesses in the matched sample are on the Alipay platform
for a longer period than those in the full sample. Because we restrict our matched sample to
those that operate continuously for all 31 months in the sample period and remove the
businesses that start or stop operations during the sample period, it is not surprising that the
businesses in the matched sample are larger and survive longer.
[Table 2 here]
2.5.1.3 Regression Results
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We conduct the regression in Equation (1) using the matched sample from the previous section
over the sample period of January 2017 to July 2019. We report the result in Table 3. Column
(1) is based on the entire matched sample. We note that some business owners in the sample
have never drawn any digital loan during the sample period. As a result, in Column (2), we
include only business owners who draw loans at least once during the sample period. In both
columns, the coefficient on the interaction term, Migrant×DrawLoan, is positive and
significant, indicating that migrant business owners experience greater performance gain from
Fintech microloans, relative to matched native business owners.
We then estimate the economic significance of the incremental gain from digital loans
for migrant businessmen relative to their native counterparts, based on the coefficient on
Migrant×DrawLoan, which is 0.1406 in Column (1) and 0.0889 in Column (2). Our dependent
variable is Log(Revenue), meaning that when Migrant×DrawLoan changes from zero to one,
revenue increases by 14.06% (Column 1) and 8.89% (Column 2). In the matched sample, the
median revenue is Chinese yuan 34,457 or US $5,012. We thus estimate that the incremental
dollar gain for migrants with a median revenue relative to natives equals $705
(=$5,012*14.06%) for the full matched sample and $446 (=$5,012*8.89%) for the subsample
that requires all business owners to have drawn digital loans. Overall, the 9%-14% additional
benefit gained by migrants (relative to native entrepreneurs) from using Fintech loans is
economically significant and suggests that Fintech plays an important role in helping
disadvantaged groups such as migrants.
In addition, the coefficient on the migrant indicator, Migrant, is insignificant in
Column (1). This is not surprising because one of the matching variables which we use to
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construct the matched sample is business performance. The coefficient on Migrant, however,
becomes positive and significant in Column (2). This is possibly due to that in Column (2), we
drop the business owners who never draw loans, and these dropped business owners may be
more likely to be migrants with weaker performance. The coefficient on DrawLoan is positive
in both columns, indicating that business owners who take out a loan generate a greater revenue
than those who do not. Note that the association between DrawLoan and business performance
could be consistent with that digital loans help improve firm performance, or firms that
perform better may require more loans for expansion or be in a better financial position to
obtain loans. We, however, cannot disentangle the above possibilities due to data constraints.
As a result, one should interpret the association between DrawLoan and business performance
with the above caveat in mind.
In terms of control variables, we find that businesses with online shops generate higher
revenues, while those with QR-codes have lower revenues. Opening an online shop is more
complicated than registering for a money-receiving QR code, and QR-code business owners
tend to be much smaller (such as street vendors). As a result, online business owners are more
sophisticated and earn more. We also find that those who are female, have used Alipay for a
longer period, and are single earn higher revenues. Finally, we include the level of city
economic development and city-level GDP per capita. We find that businesses located in more
developed cities have greater revenues. The signs on the city-level GDP per capita variable,
however, are negative. One possible reason that we control for city fixed effects in the
regressions. City-level GDP per capita only varies by year and thus is slow changing over our
sample monthly observations. City fixed effects may thus absorb the variation in city-level
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GDP per capita and cause the sign to flip.
[Table 3 here]
Table 4 provides a robustness check for the baseline regression result. We replace the
dependent variable, revenue, with alternative business activity measures, namely the logarithm
of the number of transactions and the logarithm of the number of unique customers for each
business each month. Consistent with the main regression result, we find positive and
significant coefficients for both DrawLoan and the interaction term, Migrant×DrawLoan, and
for both the full matched sample and the subsample that requires all business owners to have
drawn loans at least once. Overall, Tables 3 and 4 provide robust evidence that migrant
entrepreneurs benefit more from Fintech microloans than natives do.
[Table 4 here]
2.5.2 Heterogeneity Analysis
Having established that migrants generate more revenues than natives after using Fintech
loans, we now explore the cross-sectional heterogeneities in the result along various
dimensions.
2.5.2.1 Financial Constraint
First, we explore whether financial constraint affects the differential effect of Fintech loans
on business performance. Existing theory shows that finance services enhance equality only
when the service is provided to the “extensive margin”, that is, the individuals who would
otherwise have no access to those services (Beck et al., 2007). We thus conjecture that the
differential effect be more prominent for migrants who are more financially constrained and
have less access to alternative financial services.
We test this financial constraint hypothesis by adding additional interaction terms to
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Equation (1):
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) = 𝑏1 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑏2 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾0 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾1 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + +𝛾2 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾3 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐴𝑐 +
𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

(2)

where FinConstraint is an indicator for individuals with more financial constraints. The
definitions of other variables are the same as in Equation (1). We expect to see that the
coefficient, 𝛾3 , is positive and significant.
We use two methods to define individuals with more stringent financial constraint. The
first one is the individuals with low initial revenues because people with lower income or
business with lower revenue are more likely to be financially excluded. Particularly, we
identify individuals with more financial constraint being those with the revenue at the
beginning of the sample (March 2017 specifically) below median, within the first tercile, or
below 25th percentile.10 The second way is to use businesses that only have a QR moneyreceiving code and do not operate online. Online businesses require more resources (e.g.,
laptop, network) and be more sophisticated (e.g., webpage design) than an offline business
receiving payment with a QR code. Small street vendors who receive payment solely by cash
or QR codes are less likely to have access to traditional loans. As a result, these offline
businesses owning a QR code are likely to be more financially constrained.
The result in Table 5 confirms this conjecture. The coefficient, y3, on the interaction

We do not define “beginning” as January (the starting point of the sample data) or February of 2017 to avoid
the impact of seasonal effect from migrants' massive Spring Festival hometown-returning effect.
10
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term, Migrant×DrawLoan×FinConstraint , is positive and significant for various financial
constraint measures. That is, the additional revenue gain for migrants over natives following
using digital credit is more prominent for more financially constrained migrants. This is in line
with our conjecture that Fintech microloans benefit migrants by making financial resources
more accessible. For native entrepreneurs, since some financial resources are already available
to them, the introduction of Fintech loans do not provide as large benefits to them as to
constrained migrants. To sum up, the results suggest a positive role of microloans in supporting
the migrants by relaxing their financial constraints and increasing financial inclusion.
[Table 5 here]
2.5.2.2 Economic Development Level
We then investigate how economic development affects the differential impact of digital credit
on migrants versus natives. More economically developed areas have a larger migrant-native
gap in financial access (with migrants being financially disadvantaged), and thus the adoption
of Fintech loans will give a more significant boost in benefiting migrant entrepreneurs. On the
other hand, in less economically developed areas, relationship (rather than economic
mechanisms) may play a larger role in lending, and therefore, migrants are more likely to be
financially excluded. The use of Fintech loans thus helps migrants more in these less developed
areas.
We use two measures of economic development. In the first measure, we sort all the
cities in the matched sample based on their GDP per capita in year 2017 and classify them into
low, medium, and high economic development levels according to terciles. The second
measure is based on geographic regions. Southern and eastern China achieve greater economic
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success than the rest of the country due to historical reasons (that is, southern and eastern
regions experiment economic reforms earlier than other regions). We compare south (more
developed) vs. north (less developed), and east (more developed) vs. non-east (less developed).
Specifically, we use Qinling Mountains-Huaihe River to divide China into the North and South
regions and follow National Bureau of Statistics of China to define East area (more developed)
and combine the rest of the areas as non-East area (less developed).
Table 6 presents the result with different economic development levels. We find that
the positive interaction term is only present in cities or areas with more advanced economic
development: cities with high GDP per capita, southern area, and eastern area. In other areas,
the interaction term is either insignificant or negative. Overall, migrants experience
incremental gain more than natives do only in better developed regions. This is consistent with
that more economically developed areas have a larger migrant-native gap in financial access,
and thus the disadvantaged migrants are more likely to gain from Fintech loans. This does not
rule out alternative explanations, such as migrants benefiting more from larger economic
opportunities in more developed areas.
[Table 6 here]
2.5.2.3 Risk Attitude
We explore potential heterogeneity among groups with different risk attitudes: does the
income effect we find occur in less or more risk-averse migrants? We do not have ex ante
expectations as both ways can work: Risk-seeking individuals may benefit more from Fintech
as they tend to use funds in high-risk-high-return projects; by contrast, risk-averse
entrepreneurs may gain more because they are less likely to seek fundings from other risky
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funding sources and then are more likely to be underserviced financially.
We use gender and age of the business owners as proxies of risk attitudes. Previous
finance and psychology literature finds that men are overconfident relative to women, and
women tend to be less risk-taking in executive decisions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Previous
studies also show the evidence that risk-taking decreases with age (McInish, 1982; Morin and
Suarez, 1983; Palsson, 1996). We thus split the sample by the sample median of ages, with the
younger group considered as more risk-taking.
Table 7 presents the result based on groups with different risk attitudes. The interaction
term, Migrant×DrawLoan, is positive and significant only in the female group and the older
group, suggesting that the income effect of Fintech loans is only present in relatively riskaverse business owners. One possible explanation is that risk-taking groups may have already
explored other financing sources (such as P2P), while risk-averse individuals have tighter
resources and thus are more likely to be underserved ex ante.
[Table 7 here]
2.5.2.4 Signup Period
We then examine how the length of the business owner's Fintech signup period affects the
differential impact on migrant and native microentrepreneurs. According to the firm life cycle
theory (Bulan and Subramanian, 2011), a business generally follows a life-cycle trajectory
from origin to maturity, associated with a shrinking investment opportunity and decreasing
cost of raising external capital. Thus, external financing resources such as Fintech loans are
more relevant for new businesses. We use sign up period as a coarse measure for firm age and
expect to see the effect to be more prominent among newly registered microentrepreneurs.
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We define the sign-up-early group as those whose signup period as determined in
March 2017 is longer than the sample median of 22 months, and the sign-up-late group as
those whose signup period is shorter than the sample median.11 Table 8 shows that the positive
interaction term only occurs in the sign-up-late group, suggesting that migrants who are
relatively new to the Fintech platform gain more than natives after using the Fintech loans,
consistent with the conjecture from the firm life cycle theory that Fintech is more beneficial to
younger firms.
One caveat about the above result is that the result could be due to the way businesses
are operated. Among the sign-up-late group, about one third of businesses have QR moneyreceiving codes only and do not operate any online shops, one third own online shops only,
and one third have both QR codes and online shops. In contrast, among the sign-up-early
group, 93% of the businesses operate an online shop. Thus the insignificant interaction term
for the sign-up-early group could be associated with the online business operation because
whether the business owner lives in her hometown (as a native) or another province (as a
migrant) becomes less relevant when the main business is operated online.
Another caveat is that newly registered businesses are not necessarily new businesses,
and we do not rule out alternative explanations such as the superior performance of newly
registered users reflecting their stronger motivation to show a good credit history.
[Table 8 here]

11

The sample median of 22 months is based on the signup period as determined in March 2017. In Table 2
Panel B, the median signup period is 15 months for the full sample and 39 months for the matched sample;
these numbers are based on the signup period determined each specific month during the sample period.
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2.6 Discussion
The results in this paper need to be interpreted with the following points in mind. First, the
association between DrawLoan and business performance could be consistent with that digital
loans help improve firm performance, or firms that perform better may require more loans for
expansion or be more able to obtain loans. We, however, cannot disentangle the above
possibilities due to the data constraint. The data provider cannot provide us with details on
loan initiation, loan approval, loan amount, credit score, etc. As a result, we should note this
caveat when interpreting the association between DrawLoan and business performance.
Second, migrating to another city is an individual's endogenous choice, and the result
we investigate in the paper could be affected by the self-selection bias. It is possible that
individuals who are more competitive tend to migrate to larger cities. As a result, it could be
that the observed migrants are those who can survive the competition in larger cities, while
those who once migrated yet couldn't survive are back to the hometown and thus are observed
as natives. So the result that migrants gain more from Fintech could be contaminated by that
surviving migrants are more competitive and thus perform better. We, however, attempt to
alleviate the above concern via matching migrants with natives on exante business
performance and an array of personal characteristics (such as age and education). The statistics
(Table 2 Panel A) also show that migrants and natives in the matched sample are similar in exante performance and demographics (including gender and age).
Third, in the paper, we define migrants as those who were born in one province but
lived in a different province at the end of 2018. This categorization may include some highly
nativized individuals who moved to the destination city during their young childhood. Since
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the data does not supply the information on when the individuals moved and there are no
available statistics on the composition of migrants by the age of moving, we acknowledge that
in this paper, those classified as migrants may include some nativized individuals.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of digital credit on the business performance of migrant versus
native business owners who run personal businesses, based on Alipay's business owner level
data. Our results show that migrant business owners benefit more from Fintech microfinance,
compared to their native counterparts. Such differential impact is more prominent for
microentrepreneurs who are more financially constrained, supporting that the underserviced
population is more likely to gain from digital credit. Other heterogeneity analyses show that
the differential impact between migrants and natives mainly exists in more economically
developed areas, for more risk averse business owners, and among the owners who are
relatively new to the Fintech platform.
Our results provide potential policy implications. Although the micro-business
owners in the sample may have income sources other than their owned micro-businesses
covered in this study, the difference in business revenues between migrant and native
business owners could imply whether the income gap between migrants and natives widens
or narrows. The results in the paper, therefore, suggest that Fintech-based microfinance may
help narrow the income inequality between migrants (who are often disadvantaged in the
places which are not their hometowns) and natives and thus improve economic integration.
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Tables and Figures for Essay One
Figure 1: Finance and Inequality: Traditional Banking versus Digital Credit
The figure shows how the approaches in which banking deals with information asymmetry
between lenders and borrowers lead to unequal economic opportunities for larger versus smaller
businesses. Panel A is the case of traditional banking and Panel B is the case of digital finance.

Panel A: Traditional Banking

Panel B: Digital credit
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Main Variables for Individual Business owners
This table reports the descriptive statistics for micro-level individual business owner data.
Revenues, number of transactions (Ntransactions), and number of customers (Ncustomers) are
the data for each business owner each month. All dollar amounts are converted from Chinese
yuan (￥) to US dollars (1 US dollar = 6.8755 Chinese yuan based on Federal Reserve Foreign
Exchange Rates H.10 on December 31, 2018). Variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1.

Variables

# Obs.

Mean

STD

p25

Median

p75

Dependent variable: Main
Revenue

￥27,329.35 ￥71,071.62 ￥1,425.50 ￥5,253.00
4,181,955
($3,974.89) ($10,336.94) ($207.33) ($764.02)

￥
18,406.00
($2,677.04)

Dependent variable: Alternative
Ntransactions

4,181,955

236.26

528.37

24

68

197

Ncustomers

4,181,955

164.07

391.87

13

46

131

DrawLoan

4,181,955

0.13

0.34

0

0

0

Migrant

4,181,955

0.27

0.44

0

0

1

Taobao_seller

4,181,955

0.25

0.43

0

0

0

IsQRcode

4,181,955

0.88

0.32

0

1

1

Age

4,181,955

36.14

9.20

29

34

42

Male

4,181,955

0.5780

0.4939

0

1

1

Signup_period
(months)

4,181,955

18.85

16.64

7

15

24

Child_score

3,978,471

0.6037

0.3473

0.2595

0.6797

0.9541

RealEstate

4,178,807

0.6089

0.1712

0.4928

0.5662

0.6665

Marriage

3,978,471

0.5963

0.2638

0.3945

0.6588

0.8181

City_degree

4,181,955

2.83

1.19

2

3

4

Gdppc (city level)

4,176,370

￥84,417
($12,278)

￥45,665
($6,642)

￥44,672
($6,497)

￥75,987
($11,052)

￥118,015
($17,165)

Independent variables:

Control variables:
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Sample Representativeness of the Matched Sample
This table reports descriptive statistics for matched sample and its sample representativeness
compared to the original full sample. Panel A shows summary statistics for migrants and matched
natives during the matching period of March – May 2017. For each variable, we provide mean,
standard deviation, and t-statistics for the mean difference between the migrant group and the
native group. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Panel B
presents summary statistics of the variables in the original full sample and the matched sample.
Section 5.1.2 provides matching details. All dollar amounts are converted from Chinese yuan (￥
) to US dollars (1 US dollar = 6.8755 Chinese yuan based on Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange
Rates H.10 on December 31, 2018). December 31, 2018 is within our sample period of January
2017 to July 2019, and is also the time point at which our data provider measures all the personal
characteristics, including native vs. migrant status, gender, age, the likelihood of marriage, etc.
Variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Migrants and Matched Natives during Matching Period
t-statistic
Matched Sample:
Matched Sample:
for mean
Migrants
Natives
difference
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Variable
Mean
STD
Mean
STD
(1)-(3)
￥59,605.62 ￥77,910.37 ￥59,695.73 ￥76,841.24
RevenueMay 2017
($8669.28)
($11331.59) ($8682.38) ($11176.09)
-0.1322
RevenueApril 2017

￥62,342.03 ￥80,282.19 ￥62,945.48 ￥80,748.74
($9067.27) ($11676.56) ($9155.04) (11744.42)

RevenueMarch 2017

￥72,062.87 ￥89,795.83 ￥71,677.35 ￥89,523.33
($10481.11) ($13060.26) ($10425.04) ($13020.63)
380.59
544.69
390.74
541.83
474.29
698.24
495.18
710.98

NcustomersMay 2017
NtransactionsMay 2017
Revenue growthFrom

-1.0539

1.7871*
-0.6675
-1.0313

-0.1017

0.2799

-0.0916

0.2707

-1.9253*

-0.0136

0.2897

-0.0205

0.2890

1.3261

-0.1066

0.3921

-0.1024

0.3883

-0.6533

Taobao_seller
0.8049
0.3965
IsQRcode
0.6000
0.4902
Farm_loan
0.2293
0.4206
Male
0.5951
0.4912
Age
35.7024
8.4916
Signup_period
30.7415
17.2603
Panel B: Sample Representative Analysis

0.7902
0.5744
0.2305
0.5707
36.0512
30.7037

0.4074
0.4947
0.4214
0.4953
9.0649
17.5419

0.9096
1.2068
-0.0940
1.0370
-0.8623
0.0464

March to April 2017

Revenue growthFrom
April to May 2017

Revenue growthFrom
March to May 2017
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Variable
Revenue

Mean

STD

p25

p50

p75

￥27,329
($3975)

￥71,072
($10337)

￥1,426
($207)

￥5,253
($764)

￥18,406
($2677)

￥70,806
($10298)

￥97,564
($14190)

￥
13,909
($2023)

￥
34,457
($5012)

￥82,200
($11955)

236.2578
509.1268

528.3743
772.3509

24
79

68
208

197
564

Full Sample
Matched Sample

164.073
396.6215

391.872
596.9597

13
63

46
164

131
445

Signup_period
Full Sample
Matched Sample

18.8470
40.7226

16.6434
19.5565

7
25

15
39

24
56

Taobao_seller
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.2492
0.7976

0.4325
0.4018

0
1

0
1

0
1

IsQRcode
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.8803
0.5872

0.3246
0.4923

1
0

1
1

1
1

Farm_loan
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.3615
0.2299

0.4804
0.4208

0
0

0
0

1
0

Edu_notmissing
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.0431
0.0024

0.2032
0.0493

0
0

0
0

0
0

Male
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.5780
0.5829

0.4939
0.4931

0
0

1
1

1
1

Age
Full Sample
Matched Sample

36.1400
35.8768

9.2039
8.7794

29
30

34
34

42
40

Full Sample

Matched Sample

Ntransactions
Full Sample
Matched Sample
Ncustomers
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Child_score
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.6037
0.6547

0.3473
0.3294

0.2595
0.3449

0.6797
0.7732

0.9541
0.9684

RealEstate
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.6089
0.5948

0.1712
0.1692

0.4928
0.4888

0.5662
0.5490

0.6665
0.6232

Marriage
Full Sample
Matched Sample

0.5963
0.6119

0.2638
0.2650

0.3945
0.4414

0.6588
0.6771

0.8181
0.8326
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Table 3: Effect of Digital Credit on Business Owners’ Revenues: Migrants vs. Natives
This table presents the impact of digital microloans on migrant business owners’ revenues
compared to their native counterparts. We report the result of the regression in Equation (1), using
the migrant business owners and the matched native business owners matched by city, month,
industry, initial revenues, age, etc. (Section 5.1.2 provides matching details). Migranti is an
indicator variable equal to one if business owner 𝑖 is a migrant (his/her residential province as of
the end of December 2018 differs from the province where he/she was born), and zero otherwise.
DrawLoanit is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner i draws loan credit during
month t. Other variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1. All the control variables are timeinvariant (their values are measured as of the end of December 2018), with the exception of
Ln(gdppc), which varies by year, and Signup_period, which varies by month. Column (1) reports
the result using the entire matched sample. Column (2) reports the result on the subsample that
contains only business owners who draw loans at least once during the entire sample period.
Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.

Dep. var. = Ln(Revenueit)

Migranti
DrawLoanit
Migranti×DrawLoanit
Taobao_seller
IsQRcode
Farm_loan
Ln(gdppc)
Male

(1) Full
matched
sample

(2) Full matched sample but
including only business owners who
draw loans at least once during the
sample period

0.0020

0.0467***

[0.0122]

[0.0152]

0.1097***

0.1190***

[0.0254]

[0.0260]

0.1406***

0.0889**

[0.0339]

[0.0348]

0.3736***

-0.0450

[0.0339]

[0.0625]

-0.0815***

-0.1334***

[0.0142]

[0.0171]

0.0626***

-0.0558*

[0.0229]

[0.0287]

-0.0405**

-0.0469*

[0.0177]

[0.0209]

-0.0457***

-0.0270**

[0.0122]

[0.0146]
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Age
Age_sqr
Edu_notmissing
Child_score
RealEstate
Marriage
Signup_period

City_developlevelis1

-0.0046

-0.0112*

[0.0068]

[0.0090]

-0.0001

-0.0000

[0.0001]

[0.0001]

0.0343

0.0911

[0.0872]

[0.00809]

-0.0656***

0.0425***

[0.0066]

[0.0260]

0.2010***

0.2573

[0.0345]

[0.0417]

-0.5910***

-0.5967***

[0.0321]

[0.0401]

***

0.0071***

[0.0004]

[0.0004]

0.0061

17.7040

***

18.019***

[0.3775]
City_developlevelis2

18.371

[0.4248]

***

18.608***

[0.3849]

[0.4329]

City FE

Yes

Yes

Industry FE

Yes

Yes

Occupation FE

Yes

Yes

Month FE

Yes

Yes

# Obs.

50,840

35,712

Adj R2

0.0301

0.0340
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Table 4: Effect of Digital Credit on Business Owners’ Transaction Activities and
Customers: Migrants vs. Natives
This table presents the impact of digital microloans on migrant business owners’
transaction activities and customers compared to their native counterparts. We report the
result of the regression in Equation (1), using the migrant business owners and the matched
native business owners matched by city, month, industry, initial revenues, age, etc. (Section
5.1.2 provides matching details). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
number of recorded transactions each month for Columns (1) and (2), and is the natural
logarithm of the number of unique customers each month for Columns (3) and (4). Migranti
is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner 𝑖 is a migrant (his/her residential
province as of the end of December 2018 differs from the province where he/she was born),
and zero otherwise. DrawLoanit is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner i
draws loan credit during month t. Other variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1. All
the control variables are the same as those in Table 3. Columns (1) and (3) report the result
using the entire matched sample, and Columns (2) and (4) reports the result on the
subsample that contains only business owners who draw loans at least once during the
entire sample period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dep. var. = Ln(Ntransactions)

Dep. var. = Ln(Ncustomers)

(1) Full
matched
sample

(2) including only
business owners
who draw loans at
least once during
the sample period

(3) Full
matched
sample

(4) including only
business owners
who draw loans at
least once during
the sample period

-0.0443***

-0.0521***

-0.0310***

-0.0399**

[0.0125]

[0.0155]

[0.0124]

[0.0155]

0.1894***

0.1573***

0.2079***

0.1627***

[0.0250]

[0.0259]

[0.0251]

[0.0260]

Migranti

0.0971***

0.1089***

0.1085***

0.1191***

×DrawLoanit

[0.0349]

[0.0360]

[0.0348]

[0.0359]

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Occupation FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Nobs

50,840

35,712

50,840

35,712

Adj R2

0.0634

0.0661

0.0678

0.0652

Migranti
DrawLoanit
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Table 5: Effect of Digital Credit on Business Owners’ Revenues: Heterogeneity by
Financial Constraint
This table presents the impact of microloans on migrant business owners’ revenues
compared to their native counterparts, conditional on business owners’ financial constraint.
We report the result of the regression in Equation (2). FinConstrainti is an indicator
variable equal to one if a business owner face more financial constraint, and zero otherwise.
In Column (1), FinConstrainti is one if the business owners have the initial revenue
(RevenueMarch 2017) below sample median, and is zero if the revenue is above sample
median. In Column (2), FinConstrainti is one if the business owners have the initial revenue
(RevenueMarch 2017) below the 25th percentile, and is zero if the revenue is above the 25th
percentile. In Column (3), FinConstrainti is one if the business owners have the initial
revenue (RevenueMarch 2017) below the 25th percentile, and is zero if the revenue is above the
75th percentile (i.e., the observations between the 25th and 75th percentiles are removed). In
Column (4), FinConstrainti is one if the business owners have the initial revenue
(RevenueMarch 2017) below the first tercile, and is zero if the revenue is above the third
percentile (i.e., the observations falling in the middle tercile are removed). In Column (5),
we define FinConstrainti as one if the business owners only have a QR money-receiving
code but do not own an online shop, and zero otherwise. Migranti is an indicator variable
equal to one if business owner 𝑖 is a migrant (his/her residential province as of the end of
December 2018 differs from the province where he/she was born), and zero otherwise.
DrawLoanit is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner i draws loan credit
during month t. Other variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1. Robust standard
errors are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.
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Dep. var. = Ln(Revenue)

FinConstrainti
Migranti
DrawLoanit

(1)
Fin
Constraint
= 1 if
initial
revenue <
p50, = 0 if
initial
revenue ≥
p50
-1.4064***

(2)
Fin
Constraint
= 1 if
initial
revenue <
p25, = 0 if
initial
revenue ≥
p25
-1.4457***

(3)
Fin
Constraint
= 1 if
initial
revenue <
p25, = 0 if
initial
revenue ≥
p75
-2.2000***

(4)
Fin
Constraint
= 1 if
initial
revenue in
tercile 1, =
0 if initial
revenue in
tercile 3
-1.9224***

[0.0150]

[0.0181]

[0.0224]

[0.0191]

[0.0352]

0.0337

**

-0.0102

-0.0017

0.0075

0.0794***

[0.0147]

[0.0126]

[0.0206]

[0.0175]

[0.0135]

***

***

***

***

0.1622***

[0.0342]

[0.0273]

0.1748

[0.0305]
Migranti×DrawLoanit
Migranti×FinConstrainti
DrawLoanit×FinConstrainti

-0.1733

**

0.1078

[0.0266]

0.1005

[0.0397]

0.2040

-0.3238***

0.0396

-0.0571

[0.0418]

[0.0356]

[0.0579]

[0.0477]

[0.0366]

-0.0289

0.0305

0.0309

0.0129

-0.3708***

[0.0210]

[0.0250]

[0.0299]

[0.0253]

[0.0335]

0.0054

-0.3211***

0.1481

**

-0.1881

***

(5)
Fin
Constraint =
1 if business
uses QR
code only
and does not
operate
online

0.0423

-0.0315

0.0871

[0.0434]

[0.0530]

[0.0600]

[0.0501]

[0.0724]

***

***

***

***

0.5389***

Migranti×DrawLoanit

0.4672

0.2252

×FinConstrainti

[0.0602]

[0.0736]

[0.0864]

[0.0713]

[0.0962]

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
50,840
0.2717

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
50,840
0.2165

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
25,420
0.4604

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
33,914
0.4071

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
50,840
0.0348

Controls
City FE
Industry FE
Occupation FE
Month FE
# Obs.
Adj R2
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0.2519

0.4472

Table 6: Effect of Digital Credit on Business Owners’ Revenues: Heterogeneity by
Economic Development Level
This table conducts the same regression as in Table 3 Column (1), subsampling by
economic development level. We first use city-level GDP per capita to measure economic
development. Specifically, all the cities in the final matched sample are sorted by their
GDP per capita in 2017, and we split the sample into three subsamples based on tercile
breakpoints and report the subsample results in Columns (1)-(3). In Columns (4)-(5), we
follow the standard method used by China, the Qinling Mountains-Huaihe River line, to
divide China into the northern (less developed) and southern (more developed) regions. In
Columns (6)-(7), we follow National Bureau of Statistics of China and define the east area
(more developed) as the following 7 provinces and 3 cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. Migranti is an
indicator variable equal to one if business owner 𝑖 is a migrant (his/her residential province
as of the end of December 2018 differs from the province where he/she was born), and zero
otherwise. DrawLoanit is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner i draws loan
credit during month t. Other variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1. Robust
standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
City-level GDP per capita

South vs. North
(4)
South
(5)
(more
North
developed)

East vs. Non-East
(6)
East (more
developed)

(7)
NonEast

0.1629***

0.0009

0.1145**

[0.0129]

[0.0380]

[0.0125]

[0.0559]

0.2758*** 0.3692***

0.0552**

0.5769***

0.1048***

0.0874

[0.0312]

[0.0648]

[0.0524]

[0.0268]

[0.0741]

[0.0260]

Migranti×

0.2074***

0.0551

-0.1078

0.1770***

-0.2086**

0.1362***

[0.0975]
0.1352

DrawLoanit

[0.0420]

[0.0926]

[0.0683]

[0.0361]

[0.0942]

[0.0348]

[0.1285]

Controls
City FE
Industry FE
Occupation
FE
Month FE
# Obs.
Adj R2

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
32,054
0.0347

Yes
6,138
0.1211

Yes
12,648
0.0401

Yes
46,314
0.0268

Yes
4,526
0.1872

Yes
48,918
0.0302

Yes
1,922
0.2337

Dep. var. =
Ln(Revenue)
Migranti

DrawLoanit

(1)
High

(2)
Medium

(3)
Low

-0.0343**

0.1207**

0.0615**

-0.0161

[0.0153]

[0.0346]

[0.0251]

0.0319
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Table 7: Effect of Digital Credit on Business Owners’ Revenues: Heterogeneity by
Risk Attitude
This table conducts the same regression as in Table 3 Column (1), subsampling by risk
attitude. In Columns (1)-(2), males are less risk-averse business owners and females are
more risk-averse. In Columns (3)-(4), younger (age below sample median) and older
business owners represent being less and more risk averse. Migranti is an indicator variable
equal to one if business owner 𝑖 is a migrant (his/her residential province as of the end of
December 2018 differs from the province where he/she was born), and zero otherwise.
DrawLoanit is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner i draws loan credit
during month t. Other variable definitions are in Appendix Table A1. Robust standard
errors are reported in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.
Dep. var. = Ln(Revenue)
Migranti

DrawLoanit

Migranti× DrawLoanit

Controls
City FE
Industry FE
Occupation FE
Month FE
# Obs.
Adj R2

(1)
Male

(2)
Female

(3)
Younger

(4)
Older

0.0301*

-0.0605**

0.1511***

-0.1099**

[0.0166]

[0.0188]

[0.0182]

[0.0168]

0.1704***

0.0432

0.1273***

0.0939**

[0.0324]

[0.0386]

[0.0351]

[0.0364]

0.0623

0.1700***

-0.0153

0.2647***

[0.0430]

[0.0543]

[0.0470]

[0.0490]

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
29,636
0.0394

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
21,204
0.0350

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
24,087
0.0546

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
26,753
0.0390
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Table 8: Effect of Digital Credit on Business Owners’ Revenues: Heterogeneity by
Signup Period
This table conducts the same regression as in Table 3 Column (1), subsampling by signup
period, which is the number of months measured at the end of March 2017 since the
business owner signs up with Alipay or Alipay’s partners. “Sign up late” includes
individuals whose signup period is shorter than sample median, while the “Sign up early”
group includes individuals whose signup_period is greater than or equal to sample median.
Migranti is an indicator variable equal to one if business owner 𝑖 is a migrant (his/her
residential province as of the end of December 2018 differs from the province where he/she
was born), and zero otherwise. DrawLoanit is an indicator variable equal to one if business
owner i draws loan credit during month t. Other variable definitions are in Appendix Table
A1. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Dep. var. =
Ln(Revenue)

Sign up early

Sign up late

0.0551***

-0.0412*

[0.0170]

[0.0179]

0.1565***

0.0559

[0.0345]

[0.0352]

Migranti×

0.0541

0.1965***

DrawLoanit

[0.0471]

[0.0468]

Controls

Yes

Yes

City FE

Yes

Yes

Industry FE

Yes

Yes

Occupation FE

Yes

Yes

Month FE

Yes

Yes

# Obs.

27,063

23,777

Adj R2

0.0443

0.0282

Migranti
DrawLoanit
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Appendix to Essay 1: Variable Definitions
Variable
Type

Definition

Natural logarithm of the total amount of money from all recorded
transactions that generate inflow into the Alipay account for each
business owner each month. Revenue is in Chinese Yuan and
winsorized at the 99% percentile. All the regressions and statistics
are first conducted using revenues measured in Chinese Yuan, and
Main
Ln(Revenue)
dependent we then convert the statistics to US dollars based on the exchange
rate of 1 US dollar = 6.8755 Chinese yuan (Federal Reserve Foreign
variable
Exchange Rates H.10 on December 31, 2018). December 31, 2018 is
within our sample period of January 2017 to July 2019, and is also
the time point at which our data provider measures all the personal
characteristics, including native vs. migrant status, gender, age, the
likelihoodlogarithm
of marriage,
Natural
of etc.
the number of recorded transactions that
Alternative generate inflow into the Alipay account for each business owner each
Ln(Ntransactions) dependent
month. Ntransactions is winsorized at the 99% percentile.
variable
Natural logarithm of the number of unique customers recorded in
Alternative transactions via Alipay account for each business owner each month
Ln(Ncustomers) dependent (multiple payments received from one single payer is considered as
variable
one customer). Ncustomers is winsorized at the 99% percentile.
DrawLoan

Migrant

Taobao_seller

IsQRcode

City_developlevel

Main
An indicator variable equal to one if the business owner draws loan
independent credit during the month, and zero otherwise.
variable
An indicator variable equal to one if the business owner is a migrant,
and zero otherwise. An individual is classified as a migrant if his/her
Main
province of residence (as of the end of December 2018) differs from
independent the province in which he/she was born (i.e., the province shown on
variable
the individual's identification card). This variable is time-invariant
for each business owner.
Control
variable &
heterogeneit
y analysis
Control
variable &
heterogeneit
y analysis
Control
variable

An indicator variable equal to one if an individual is an online
business owner (i.e., a seller on the Taobao platform) as of the end of
December 2018, and zero otherwise.
An indicator variable equal to one if an individual is a QR-code
business owner (i.e., a business owner who has registered for and
obtained a QR code for receiving business payments) as of the end
of December 2018, and zero otherwise.
A time-invariant variable on the city's economic development level,
with one being the most developed (including five most developed
cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Chongqing)
and six being the least developed.
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City_developlevel Control
is1
variable

A time-invariant variable equal to one if City_developlevel = 1, and
zero otherwise. That is, this indicator variable is one if the individual
is in the five most developed cities of China, namely Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Chongqing.

City_developlevel Control
is2
variable

A time-invariant variable equal one for if City_developlevel = 2, and
zero otherwise. These include highly developed 24 cities in China
(e.g., Nanjing, Suzhou, Qingdao, etc.) but less developed than the top
five cities.

Ln(gdppc)

Farm_loan

Male

Age

Age_sqr

Control
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita for each city each year. The data
variable & is collected from China city-level statistical yearbooks and statistical
heterogeneit bulletins.
y analysis
An indicator variable equal to one if, as of the end of December 2018,
an individual business owner has a separate microloan which is
Control
provided by Ant Group and specially used for farm-related business
variable
for people from rural areas.
Control
variable &
heterogeneit
y analysis
Control
variable &
heterogeneit
y analysis
Control
variable

An individual business owner's gender, with 0 being female and 1
being male.

An individual business owner's age as the end of December 2018.
The square of the business owner's age.

Edu_notmissing

Control
variable

Child_score

Control
variable

An indicator variable equal to one if the business owner's education
information is not missing, and zero if the education information is
missing. This variable is used instead of the original education
variable because 90% of the sample does not have explicit education
information.
The probability that the business owner has at least a child as of the
end of December 2018. The probability is estimated by Ant Group
using big data analysis. This variable is time-invariant.

RealEstate

Control
variable

The probability that the business owner owns real property as of the
end of December 2018. The probability is estimated by Ant Group
using big data analysis. This variable is time-invariant.

Marriage

Control
variable

The probability that the business owner is married as of the end of
December 2018. The probability is estimated by Ant Group using big
data analysis. This variable is time-invariant.

Signup_period

Control
variable & The number of months since the business owner signs up with
heterogeneit Alipay.
y analysis
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Occupation indicators on an individual's occupation. These
occupations include civil servants, white collar, blue collar, retirees,
and others.
Industry indicators on the industry that the business is in, including
catering, entertainment, service, retail, and others.

Occupation

Control
variable

Industry

Control
variable

FinConstraint

An indicator variable equal to one if a business owner face more
financial constraint, and zero otherwise. We use several ways to
Heterogenei define “more financial constraint”: 1) the initial revenue in March
th
ty analysis 2017 is below median (below 25 percentile, or within the first
tercile) of the entire sample after matching; 2) business owners who
only have a QR money-receiving code and do not own any online
shops.
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Chapter 3: Essay Two

Follow the Leader:
Index Tracking with Factor Models

57

Abstract
We propose a new methodology to select a subset of assets for (partial) index
replication, based on the latest research on factor models of large dimensions. Our
method selects a set of leader stocks that fully captures the factor structure of the
index to be replicated. Our selection methodology is consistent as the sample size and
the number of assets jointly approach infinity. Monte Carlo experiments show that our
estimated index replica tracks the underlying index with relatively small tracking
errors in finite samples. We show the applicability of the method by tracking the S&P
500 equally weighed index and the MSCI USA Small Cap index with promising outof-sample performance. Our method can be easily adapted for synthetic index
replication, and to incorporate measures of liquidity or transaction cost.

Keywords: Systematic risk; Index tracking; Passive fund management; Factor
models.
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3.1.

Introduction
Passively managed funds are typically based on investment portfolios that

closely mimic a certain index. For example, Exchange Trade Funds (ETFs) are lowcost portfolios that trade like stocks and track an index. The simplest strategy for
index tracking is complete (full) replication, constructing the portfolio with all stocks
included in the index. Such replication, however, is costly due to the transaction costs
associated with the purchase and sale of stocks, as is required to adapt to changes in
the index weights and composition, as well as the liquidity costs due to the inclusion
of stocks with small weights in the index (Beasley et al., 2003). An alternative is
partial replication, where the replication portfolio is constructed using only a limited
number of stocks in the index. Partial index replication substantially reduces
transaction and liquidity cost, and is therefore commonly used in practice. As an
example, the Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF (ticker VTI), which tracks the
performance of the CRSP US Total Market Index, uses only around 3,600 assets to
replicate the approximately 7,000 assets in the benchmark index. Similarly, most
fixed-income ETFs use a partial replication approach, since the fund’s benchmark
index often holds thousands of bonds, many of which have little trading activity.
In this paper, we propose a new methodology to select the subset of assets to be
used for partial index replication. The basic premise of our approach is to track
systematic factors driving the index returns instead of tracking the index itself.
Specifically, our estimation is based on the selection of a set of assets that fully
captures the factor structure of the underlying index. We refer to this set of assets as
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leader assets, and to our method as the “Follow-the-Leader” method. Our main
contribution is to propose a consistent methodology to select the leader assets set
based on the latest research on factor models for large dimensions.
Our method is computationally simple, since it only requires estimation of the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of asset returns. We start by
estimating the number of systematic factors explaining the returns of the index. This
first step can be consistently achieved through the methods proposed by Bai and Ng
(2002), Hallin and Liska (2007), Onatski (2009, 2010), or Ahn and Horenstein (2013).
Next, we estimate the factors (or factor loadings) using the principal component
method of Bai and Ng (2002) and Bai (2003). Then, for each estimated factor, we
propose an iterative procedure that selects the set of assets spanning the same space as
the common factor.
We show that the Follow-the-Leader method produces a set of assets that
consistently spans the space of common factors explaining the index when the
dimensions of the panel are large (i.e., N , T →  ). These consistency results are
based on Parker and Sul (2016) identification methods for common factors.
Moreover, we show, by Monte Carlo simulations, that the Follow-the-Leader
approach performs well in finite samples, yielding low tracking error with much less
parameter sensitivity compared to the alternative methods.
In order to test the validity of our method with real data, we conduct an empirical
exercise where we replicate the S&P500 equal weight index. The Follow-the-Leader
method shows relatively superior results in comparison with alternative asset selection
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methods. With a maximum subset of 27 leader stocks, the replica portfolio can track
the S&P 500 equal weight index with very low mean square errors. Additionally, our
method has relatively lower levels of portfolio turnover compared to alternative
methods, and thus it effectively reduces transaction costs. We find similar results
when we apply our method to track the MSCI USA Small Cap index, which includes
a larger number of assets that, on average, are less liquid than the S&P 500 index.
An additional practical advantage of the Follow-the-Leader method is that it can
be easily adapted for synthetic index replication methods, where assets that do not
belong to the index (i.e., options or futures) can be incorporated into the replica
portfolio. Also, measures of liquidity or transaction cost can be incorporated in our
selection algorithm so that the selected assets are the ones with the lowest transaction
costs.
We are not the first to study the partial index replication problem. In general, due
to computational simplicity, the index tracking problem is divided into two parts: i)
selection of the set of assets to be included in the tracking portfolio and ii) estimation
of the asset weights in the tracking portfolio. Approaches that try to jointly solve these
two problems find that the estimation procedures are computationally burdensome,
and that a solution often cannot be obtained.12 Most previous literature has focused on
the second problem only, and relatively less attention has been given to the asset

Estimating the asset weights requires minimization of a given loss function of the tracking portfolio
with respect to the index (i.e., the tracking error), and allowing for different sets of assets in the tracking
portfolio requires the incorporation of additional restrictions in the optimization problem that make the
feasible domain non-convex (van Montfort et al. 2008).
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selection problem.13 To the best of our knowledge, Corielli and Marcellino (2006)
(CM-2006 hereafter) is the most recent study on asset selection methodologies. CM2006 proposes a selection criterion for assets to be included in the replica portfolio
that depends on the correlation of these assets’ prices with estimated latent factors.14
This procedure depends on an ad-hoc threshold level of correlation to select which
assets are included in the replica portfolio. Our approach is related to CM-2006, since
it is also based on a factor model. However, we incorporate a formal procedure for
asset selection that produces a subset of assets that consistently spans the index factor
space. Our Monte Carlo simulations and empirical exercise evidence show the
importance of our formal procedure in comparison with the CM-2006 approach.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: in Section 3.2, we present a
brief review of the literature on index tracking, and then present our methodology and
study its large sample properties. In Section 3.3, we summarize the finite sample
properties of the method by Monte Carlo simulations. Section 3.4 is dedicated to the
empirical exercises. We conclude in Section 3.5.

3.2.

Index Tracking Methodology

3.2.1. The Index Tracking Problem

We present a complete review of the literature in this area when we introduce the index tracking
problem in Section 2.1 of the paper.
14
Specifically, CM’s (2006) measure of correlation is the coefficient of determination R 2 of regressions
of the factors and the asset prices.
13
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In this section, we formalize the index tracking problem. The price of an index in
period t is defined as follows:

Vt = wpt

(1)

where pt and w are the N  1 and 1 N vectors of security prices and index weights,
respectively, for period t = 1,

, T . In this paper, we assume that the weights are

known at period t . Most benchmark indices available in the market report the
constituents’ weights or construction methodology.15 Nevertheless, this assumption
can be relaxed without affecting our theoretical results. We focus on the problem of
replicating Vt by using a Q  1 vector of asset prices, qt , which is a subset of pt ;
thus, Q  N . This problem is also known as sampling replication, where the index is
reproduced using a tracking portfolio that contains a smaller number of the assets
contained in the index.16 Fund managers will consider using sampling replication for
very large, illiquid, or international market indices: cases in which transaction costs
become a great concern.
Our tracking portfolio is defined as follows:
Vˆt =  qt ,

(2)

where  is a 1 Q vector of tracking portfolio weights.
In general, due to computational simplicity, the index tracking problem is divided

For example, the Russell equity indexes, Nasdaq 100, and S&P GSCI.
It is possible to include assets that are not part of the index; our methods can be easily extended to such
cases.
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into two parts: i) selection of the set of assets to be included in the tracking portfolio
(estimation of qt ) and ii) estimation of the asset weights in the tracking portfolio (i.e.
estimation of  ).
Approaches that try to jointly solve these two problems find that the estimation
procedures are computationally burdensome, and that a solution frequently cannot be
obtained.17 Most previous literature has focused on the second problem only, that is
on estimating the weights of the assets in the tracking portfolio given the subset of
assets included in the portfolio. The weights are estimated by optimizing measures of
tracking quality, and the most common method is the minimization of the tracking
error.18 Previous studies have proposed methods for minimization of the tracking
errors based on simple heuristic approaches, like equal weighting, market
capitalization weighting, or price weighting, (e.g., Beasley et al., 2003; Li et al.,
2014), but also by more complicated mathematical approaches, including graduated
non-convexity methods (e.g., Coleman et al., 2006) and clustering-based methods
(e.g., Focardi and Fabozzi, 2004).
Relatively less attention has been given to the asset selection problem that
involves determining how many and which assets should be included in the tracking
portfolio. Karlow (2012) reviewed related works and classified the selection methods

Estimating the asset weights requires minimization of a given loss function of the tracking portfolio
with respect to the index (i.e., the tracking error), and allowing for different sets of assets in the tracking
portfolio requires the incorporation of additional restrictions in the optimization problem that make the
feasible domain non-convex (van Montfort et al. 2008).
17

Tracking error can be in general defined as the difference between the tracking portfolio and the index
measures in terms of prices, simple returns or log returns.
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into three categories: i) simple selection criteria, ii) optimized selection, and iii)
coverage of index structure methods. Under the “simple selection criteria” methods,
assets are ranked according to a given selection criterion, and the highest ranked
assets are included in the tracking portfolio. Common selection criterion are the
assets’ weights in the index, market capitalization (e.g., van Montfort et al. 2008),
performance (e.g., Larsen and Resnik, 1998), level of correlation or cointegration with
the index (e.g., van Montfort et al. 2008), traded volume (Rey and Seiler, 2001), and
market betas (e.g., van Montfort et al. 2008), among others. These heuristic
approaches are easy to apply, but they suffer from three main drawbacks: arbitrary
decision on the number of assets, the risk of including too many assets with duplicate
information, and the possibility of not capturing all systematic risk.
“Optimized selection” methods select assets in the tracking portfolio by solving
an optimization problem with a cardinality constraint. The optimization problem tries
to group assets based on some measure of similarity, and then selects only a set
number of representative assets. These methods are typically complicated and
computationally burdensome. Moreover, these methods may produce replica
portfolios with low levels of diversification, since the tracking portfolio, by design,
will contain assets that are very similar to the index and that are likely to be
redundant.
The “coverage of index structure” methods aim at selecting assets to mimic the
index’s structure by using stratified sampling (Maginn et al. 2007) and hierarchical
clustering (Focardi and Fabozzi, 2004; and Dose and Cincotti, 2005). These methods
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mostly retain the simplicity of the “simple selection criteria”, while also greatly
alleviating the concern of including redundant assets as in the “optimized selection”
methods. However, they still face the challenge of deciding the number of assets, as
well as spanning the risk in the index. A third alternative under the “coverage of index
structure” methods are approaches based on dimensionality reduction. Factor-based
methods like CM-2006 and the one proposed in this paper fall into this category. We
describe the CM-2006 approach in detail in Section 3, since we use it as a benchmark
for our simulations. In the next section we present our Follow-the-Leader approach to
consistently select the subset of assets ( qt ) to be included in the tracking portfolio.

3.2.2.

Selection of Leaders: Follow-the-Leader

In this section we describe the Follow-the-Leader method to identify the set of
assets in the tracking portfolio with prices qt . Suppose that returns of the assets in an
index can be described by a linear factor model,

rit = i Ft +  it ,
where rit is the return of asset i at time t with i = 1,
k  1 vector of f1t ,

(3)

, N and t = 1,

, T . Ft is a

f kt common factors, i is a 1 k vector of factor loadings, and

 it is the idiosyncratic error. The factors in Ft , the factor loadings in i , and the
number of factors k are unobservable. We assume that the factor model in equation
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(3) is a linear factor model of large dimensions, as defined by Bai and Ng (2002)19,
where the asymptotic theory is developed under the assumption that both N and T
are large.
The basic premise of our approach is to track the factors driving the index returns
instead of tracking the index itself. We will identify a set of stocks (leader stocks) that
capture the variation of the common factors Ft (i.e., span the factor space), and this
set of stocks will be used to construct the tracking portfolio. In this section, we show
how to consistently identify these leaders.
We start by explaining the Follow-the-Leader method with a simplified example.
Suppose that the number of factors in equation (3) is two ( k = 2 ) and that there are a
group of five leader stocks that are able to fully span the space of these two factors.
Consider the following regressions of each asset returns on these leaders:

rit = ai + bi1leader 1t +

+ bi 5leader5t +  it ,

(4)

Since the set of five leader stocks fully replicate the space of these two factors, the
residuals of the regressions in equation (4) will have no factor structure. Thus,
estimation of the number of factors in these residuals will be equal to zero.
Now suppose we want to test if a given group of stock returns, say r1t ,

, r5t , can

fully capture the factor space. Assuming that the factors f1 and f 2 are observable,

19

Factor models in large dimensions have been extensively studied in the last two decades. Bai (2003),

Choi (2012), Forni et al. (2000, 2005), and Stock and Watson (2002a, 2002b), among others, have
proposed consistent estimators for the common factors and loadings. Meanwhile, Ahn and Horenstein
(2013), Bai and Ng (2002), and Onatski (2009) suggested consistent estimation procedures for the
number of common factors.
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implementation of the test will require estimation of the following regressions for
each asset return i = 1,

If r1t ,

N:

rit = a1,i + b1,i1r 1t +

+ b1,i 5 r5t + 1,i f 2t + 1,it

(5.1)

rit = a2,i + b2,i1r 1t +

+ b2,i 5 r5t + 2,i f1t +  2,it

(5.2)

, r5t are able to fully capture the factor space (i.e., they are leaders) then

both panels of residuals, ˆ1,it and ˆ2,it with i = 1,
factor structure. However, if r1t ,

N and t = 1,

T should have no

, r5t are only able to capture the space spanned by

the first factor f1t , then only the residuals from equations 5.1 ( ˆ1,it for i = 1,

N and

t = 1,

T ) will have a zero factor structure. The residuals from equations 5.2 ( ˆ2,it for

i = 1,

N and t = 1,

if r1t ,

, r5t are only able to span the space of f 2t , then the residuals from equations

T ) should still be explained by one common factor. Similarly,

5.2 will have no factor structure, and the residuals from equations 5.1 continue to be
explained by one factor. Therefore, testing for the number of factors in the residuals
of equations 5.1 and 5.2 will provide information about the capacity of a set of leaders
on capturing the space spanned by the systematic factors.
Several comments are necessary before formally presenting our methods. First,
our methods rely on estimation of factors and number of factors. Consistent
estimation of the factors and loadings in the model in equation (3) can be obtained by
the method of principal components (PC) proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) and Bai
(2003). Estimation of the number of factors can be obtained using methodologies
proposed for factor models in large dimensions such as those of Bai and Ng (2002),
Hallin and Liska (2007), Onatski (2009, 2010), and Ahn and Horenstein (2013).
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Second, our results are only one directional in the sense that if r1t ,

, r5t are

deemed as stock leaders, the residuals in equations (5.1) and (5.2) will not have a
common factor structure; however, this does not imply that all stocks in r1t ,
leaders. For example, suppose that r1t ,

, r5t are

, r4t are the only true leaders and that r5t has

no major role explaining the factors. Then, as long as you include r1t ,

, r4t in the

regression, the residuals in equations (5.1) and (5.2) will still have zero factors.
Consequently, our test requires a carefully designed iterative testing procedure to
avoid including assets that have an irrelevant role in explaining the factors. In the next
section, we provide a step-by-step methodology to select the assets for the test in
order to improve computational efficiency and maintain consistency.
Next, we formally describe our test. Let Pjt = [rj ,1t ,

, rj ,mt ]' be a given set j of

m asset returns from the index. Then define Pjt as an approximate dominant leader

set for the factor f jt if and only if f jt −  j Pjt =  jt for j = 1,

k and  jt =

 jt
T

where  jt has finite variance as N , T →  and  j is 1 m vector of coefficients
defining a linear combination of the assets in Pjt . Thus, asymptotically Pjt fully
captures f jt .20
Suppose you want to test if any given set of assets Pjt is an approximate
dominant leader set for a given factor. Our test is based on the estimation of number
of factors in the residuals of the regressions below:

20

Our notation implies that there is just one approximate dominant leader set Pjt for each factor f jt ,

however it is possible that there are multiple approximate dominant leader sets for each factor. We made
this simplification in notation to improve tractability of our results and since our estimation procedure
will identify only a single set for each factor.
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rit = i , j ( j Pjt ) +  i , − j fˆ− j ,t +  j ,it for j = 1,

k

(6)

where, fˆ− j ,t is a set including all estimated factors except for fˆj ,t and  i ,− j are the
corresponding regression coefficients of conformable dimensions. In the case of just
one factor ( k = 1 ), then fˆ− j ,t and  i ,− j should not be included in equations (6). i , j
are the regression coefficients for  j Pjt .

Proposition: Let ˆ j be the estimated number of factors on the residuals of equations
(6) for j = 1,

, k . Following the assumptions of Bai and Ng (2002), if Pjt is an

approximate dominant leader set for f jt , then
lim Pr ˆ1 = 0 or ˆ2 = 0 or ,

N ,T →

, ˆk = 0  = 1 ,

and if Pjt is not an approximate dominant leader set for f j ,t , then
lim Pr ˆ1 = 0 or ˆ2 = 0 or ,

N ,T →

, ˆk = 0  = 0 .

The proof comes directly from Parker and Sul (2016), where they show that the
proposition holds if Pjt includes only a single asset from the index. In our case,

Pjt = [rj ,1t ,

, rj ,mt ]' may include 1 to m variables as a linear combination  j Pjt .

However, without loss of generality, we can include  j Pjt as another asset in our
panel, and in this case, our proposition will be the same as Theorem 1 in Parker and
Sul (2016)21. The proposition shows that the test for the number of factors can be used
to consistently identify Pjt , the approximate dominant leader set for the factor f jt .
Thus, the set of assets to be included in the replica portfolio will include all assets

21

If  j Pjt is a true factor, its inclusion in the panel will improve estimation (see Boivin and Ng 2006).
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included in all potential dominant leader sets Pjt for all factors f jt where j = 1, 2

k.

Notice that in equation (6), the elements of  j are unknown. For implementation
we can define  j ,i ( j Pjt ) =  j ,i ( j ,1rj ,1t +

 j ,m rj ,mt ) =  j ,i j ,1r1t +

 j ,i j ,m rmt and

estimate equation (6) as:

rit =  j ,1i r1t +

 j ,mi rmt +  i ,− j fˆ− j ,t +  j ,it

Although the parameters  j ,i and  j ,1 ,

for j = 1,

k

(7)

 j ,m are not separately identifiable, they can

be jointly estimated by the parameters  j ,1i

 j ,mi in the regressions of equations (7),

spanning the same factor space.
Our theoretical results guarantee that the Follow-the-Leader method will provide
consistent estimation of a subset of assets in the tracking portfolio, that is, that the
assets included in the tracking portfolio will fully span the factor space of the index.

3.2.3 Implementation of the Follow-the-Leader selection method
In this section, we present a step-by-step procedure to implement the Follow-theLeader method for asset selection. As mentioned in the previous section, our
theoretical result is one directional. It guarantees that the assets selected in the
tracking portfolio fully capture the factor structure of the index, but it is possible that
some of the selected assets are not necessary to span this factor space. Consequently,
we require a carefully designed testing procedure that selects the minimum number of
assets needed to span the index while maintaining consistency and computational
efficiency.
After estimating the number of factors and the factors in our model (3), the step71

by-step procedure below is designed to select the asset leaders set Pˆjt spanning each
estimated factor fˆjt . The procedure should be repeated for each factor, and the
tracking portfolio will be the set of all assets included in all Pˆjt for j = 1, 2
Let the estimated number of factors be k̂ , and the estimated factors fˆ1t ,

i.

k.

, fˆktˆ .

Select the first asset to be included in Pjt : Rank the assets according to the
correlation of their returns with fˆjt and let the returns of the ranked assets be

r1t ,
ii.

, rNt . Set Pjt = r1t .

Test if Pjt is the set of leaders: Apply our leader test to Pjt , that is, estimate a
regression for each asset’s returns on all returns in Pjt and all factors other than

fˆjt (as in equation 7), obtain the residuals, and estimate the number of factors
in these residuals. If the number of factors in residuals = 0, set Pˆjt = Pjt and
finish. Otherwise (if the number of factors in residuals >0), go to step iii.
iii.

Add assets into Pjt : Using Pjt from step ii), estimate the residuals from the
auxiliary regression fˆjt = a + bPjt +  t and rank all stock returns not included
in Pjt by the correlation with these residuals. Let the ranked set be r1t ,

, rNt .

Update the leader set by adding the stock with the highest correlation with the
residuals, Pjt = [ Pjt , r1t ]' . Then go back to step ii.

In step one, we select the first asset to be tested as the one with returns that have the
highest correlation with the estimated factor fˆjt . In step two, we test if the selected
asset is enough to explain the factor fˆjt . If not, we add an aditional asset in step iii),
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selected as the one whose returns have the highest correlation with fˆjt after
controlling for the assets already in Pjt . This procedure warrants that any additional
asset added to Pjt adds explanatory power to fˆjt , over what is already explained by
the assets in Pjt . We repeat the algorithm above until we find Pˆjt , that is, until the
number of estimated factors in step ii) is equal to zero.22
Estimation of the factors and number of factors can be done by any of the
methods for large dimensional factor models that have been outlined in existing
literature. In this paper, we follow Bai and Ng’s (2002) principal component method.
The Follow-the-Leader procedure presented above uses a subset of assets from the
index constituents to construct the replica portfolio. However, this can be easily
modified for synthetic index replication, where the tracking portfolio may include
assets that are not part of the index, such as other stocks, stock options, or futures.
Specifically, in steps i) and iii) of the procedure, we can use any set of assets, rank
them, and proceed with the rest of steps.
Alternatively, it is possible that the fund manager will want to give priority to a
subset of stocks to be included in the tracking portfolio—for example the most liquid
stocks or the ones with lowest transaction costs. This condition can be easily
incorporated in the algorithm by modifying steps i) and iii) so that the stocks are
ranked according to a given measure of liquidity or transaction cost, instead of on the
basis of correlation to the factors. This modified procedure will select the desired

22

In step ii) we allow for the coefficients of each regression to be different
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stocks and still guarantee that the factor space of the index is explained by the
tracking portfolio.
Once the subset of stocks to be included in the replica portfolio is selected in
accordance with the Follow-the-Leader approach, the next step is to select the
portfolio weights. Methods for weight estimation are not the focus of this paper, and
therefore we follow the previous literature for our simulations and empirical exercise.
Specifically, we follow CM-2006 and estimate portfolio weights by the minimization
of sum squared errors with two constraints: 1) factor spanning constraint and 2) initial
value constraint. Specifically, we conduct the following optimization:
T

(

min  Vt − Vˆt


t =1

)

2

,

(8)

s.t.  S  = w

 Sp0 = wp0
where Vt is the index value and Vˆt the replica at period t as defined in equations 1 and
2.  is the 1 Q replica weight of Q leaders, and w is the 1 N index weight of its
composite stocks. S is the Q  N selection matrix that selects the Q leaders out of
the N stocks.  is the N  k factor loadings for the k factors estimated. p0 is the
N  1 vector of the latest observable prices (i.e., the last observations from the in-

sample data).

3.3.

Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we test the small sample properties of our Follow-the-Leader

approach. Our data generating process is designed to capture the effects of a dynamic
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factor model in prices. Each stock price in the index is generated according to the
following factor model:
pit = 1i F1t +  2i F2t + eit , eit ~ N ( 0,1)

(9)

Random Walk Factors: F1t = F1,t −1 + 1,t , 1,t ~ N ( 0,1)

(10)

Stationary Factors: F2t =  2,t ,  2,t ~ N ( 0,1) ,

(11)

where pit are stock prices for i = 1,

, N , and t = 1,

, T ; F1t is a k1  1 vector of k1

random walk factors with i.i.d. standard normal innovations 1,t , and F2t is a k2  1
vector of k 2 stationary factors generated from i.i.d. standard normal random numbers

 2,t .23 The number of true factors is k = k1 + k2 . Both the factor loadings,  1 and  2 ,
and the error term, et , are random draws from standard normal distributions. We drop
any negative prices generated. Next, we use the N generated prices to construct an
equally weighted index. We select k1 = k2 = 5 throughout the simulation analysis, so
the total number of true factors is 10. We generate the N  T panel of observations
and replicate them for 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. We use Bai and Ng’s (2002)
number of factor method with the IC2 criteria with a maximum possible number of
factors kmax = 30 .24
We present our results in comparison with CM-2006 method. Their method starts
by estimating factors in a factor model for asset prices. The number of factors to be

Our data generation process is based on normality, however Bai and Ng (2002) simulations with
alternative distributions show that factor model methods do not rely on normality. For an interesting
application of factor models for non-Gaussian processes see Ballotta et al. (2019).
24
As a robustness test, we also performed simulations using other Bai and Ng (2002) number of factors
estimation criteria and the eigenvalue ratio (ER) test of Ahn and Horenstein (2013). Our results show
that the number of factor method used does not play a critical role in our estimation. Detailed results are
available from the authors.
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estimated depends on the selection of an ad-hoc percentage of variation needed to be
explained by the factors. In their paper, they use 90% and 99% explanatory powers to
select the number of factors, which we follow in our simulations. Once the factors are
estimated, they propose the following procedure:
1. Order the factors according to their correlation with the index.
2. Choose a minimum R2 for the replication of each factor.
3. Start from factor 1.
4. Rank the shares in correlation order with the factor.
5. Regress the factor on the first share.
6. If the R2 of the regression is greater than the objective, skip the next step.
7. Add to the regression the share with the highest correlation with the
residual and go to step 6.
8. Regress the next factor on all the variables included in the analysis up to
now, and then go to step 6.
9. If all the desired factors are replicated with the desired accuracy, stop.

The previous procedure also requires the ad-hoc selection of the minimum R 2
for the replication of each factor. In our simulations we use a minimum R 2 = 0.80 , as
CM-2006 do in their paper. The final step is to determine the portfolio weights, and
the procedure is the same as our method.
To measure the tracking performance for our simulations, we employ five loss
functions on the error, Vˆt − Vt : the mean error (MEAN), the standard deviation
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(STD.DEV.), the mean absolute deviation (MAD), the maximum absolute value of
the errors (SUPMOD), and the mean squared error (MSE):

errort = Vˆt − Vt
STD.DEV . =

MEAN =

(

1
 errort − error t
T −1 t

SUPMOD = max ( errort

)

)

2

1
 errort
T t

1
 errort
T t
1
2
MSE =
( errort )

t
T

MAD =

We compute these measures for each simulated data set and report averages
across the 1,000 simulations and Monte Carlo standard errors. In addition, we also
report the correlation coefficient between the index and the replica portfolio (Correl).
We report simulation results for in-sample and out-of-sample cases. For insample results, we generate data with N assets for T periods and estimate the assets in
the replica portfolio and their weights. For the out-of-sample case, we generate
additional data with N assets for T periods, but use the assets and weights estimated
from the in-sample data.
Simulation results for N = 100 and T = 500 are presented in Table 1, and are
given in comparison with the CM-2006 methods. Our method estimates the exact true
number of factors, k = 10 , all the time, while the heuristic rule utilized in CM-2006 is
sensitive to the threshold value chosen ex ante. Specifically, it captures too few
factors, k = 3 , when the explained variance cut off is set to 90%, or too many factors,
k = 45 , for an explained variance threshold at 99.9%. This leads to very different

results for tracking performance on the CM-2006 method. For example, in the case
with 99.9% explained variance threshold, the portfolio’s seemingly good performance
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comes at the cost of using almost a full replication, since the average number of assets
in the replicate portfolio is 95.4 for an index with N = 100 . Our method, based on an
accurate estimation of the number of factors, selects 30.03 assets on average for the
replica portfolio, which we believe is reasonable for N = 100 . The tracking
performance measures indicate that our method is better than CM-2006 with 90%
cutoff value and comparable with the CM-2006 with 99.9% cutoff, in and out of the
sample. Our method is able to construct a replica portfolio with 99.98% correlation
with the index and MSE as low as 0.0071 using only 30 assets. An additional
advantage of our method is computation speed. The simulation results reported in
Table 1 took 190 hours to run using CM-2006, compared to less than 5 hours using
our method. In summary, with a formal procedure of factor and asset selection, our
method improves computation efficiency and provides a better partial replication with
almost no concern for parameter sensitivity.
Next, we focus on evaluating the finite sample performance of our method. We
begin by analyzing two general cases, first when T>N and then when N>T, and then
report the results for in-sample and out-of-sample analysis in Table 2. For the case of
T>N, we report results for N=50 and 100 with T=125, 250, and 500. This will cover
small portfolios, with six months, 1 year, and 2 years of daily data. Our results show
that the estimation of number of factors is accurate for all reported sample sizes. The
number of assets in the replica portfolio (leaders) are less than half of N for N = 50
and around 25-30% of N for N = 100 . Thus, the number of leaders does not increase
proportionally with N , and it is significantly less than the total number of assets. An
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increase in T has a minor effect on the number of leader stocks. As predicted by
theory, all tracking error measures improve as the sample size increases, in and out of
the sample. For example, when N = 50 , the mean squared error (MSE) decreases from
0.0235 to 0.0089 when T increases from 125 to 500 out of the sample. Similarly, for
T = 500 , MSE decreases from 0.0089 to 0.0071 when N increases from 50 to 100.

For the case of N>T, we report results for N =125, 250 and 500, with T=50, 100 and
250, thereby covering larger portfolios with around two months to a year of daily
data. As in the cases with T>N, our results show very reliable estimation of number of
factors for all sample sizes. The number of assets in the replica portfolio (leaders) are
relatively small in comparison with N, ranging from as low as 10% of N (N=500, T=
250) to 48% of N (N=250, T=50). Our simulation results show that when N>T, the
method is reliable when T  100 . For example, if T=100, MAD monotonically
decreases from 0.1346 when N=125, to 0.1076 and 0.0963 when N= 250 and 500
respectively in the in-sample case. Furthermore, when T=250, MAD decreases from
0.1143 for N=125 to 0.0992 and 0.0811 for when N= 250 and 500. Out-of-sample
simulations show similar patterns, and the smallest MSE is observed for N=500,
T=250.
The simulations show that our method has limitations for cases with very small T
and large N (i.e., T=50). The reason for this is that the optimization used in the
selection of portfolio weights requires that the number of stocks in the replica
portfolio be smaller than T. For cases of large N, it is more likely that more stocks are
required in the replica portfolio. For example (as shown in Table 2), in the case of
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N=250, T=50, our simulations find an average of 120.61 stocks are needed in the
replica portfolio. In this case, it is not possible to find the optimal weights for the
replica portfolio given the small T=50. Notice that this limitation is not related to the
Follow-the-Leader method proposed in the paper, since our method is only designed
to select the subset of stocks to be included in the replica portfolio and not the
portfolio weights. Methods for weight estimation are not the focus of our paper, and
therefore we follow the previous literature and minimize a sum of square residuals
that is only feasible if the number of parameters (portfolio weights) are smaller than
T.
As a final simulation experiment, we evaluate the effects of weak factors (factors
with a small signal to noise ratio) on the estimation of our replica portfolio. Several
studies estimating the number of factors have documented the importance on
estimation of identifying weak factors.25 We follow Ahn and Horenstein’s (2013) data
generation process and perform simulations using 1, 2 and 3 weak factors.
Specifically, we modify the signal to noise ratio of the stationary factors to create
weak factors as follows:
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
Weak Factors: 𝐹2𝑡
= √𝜃𝜉2,𝑡 , 𝜉2,𝑡 ~𝑁(0,1)

where θ will be the signal to noise ratio, given model errors are standard normal
distributed. Following Ahn and Horenstein (2013), we set θ to be 0.17.26 In Table 3,

See for example, Ahn and Horenstein (2013) and Onatsky 2006 for large N and T and Ahn and Perez
(2010) for fixed N.
26
In unreported experiments we tested for signal to noise ratio of weak factors as low as 0.10 with very
similar results.
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we report simulation results with 1, 2 and 3 weak factors in comparison to the
baseline case with no weak factors. Results show that the estimated number of factors
is not affected, but the number of leader stocks decreases as the number of weak
factors increases. However, the decrease is not significant, from an average of 30.032
leaders in the baseline case to 28.118 in the case with 3 weak factors. Moreover, the
accuracy of the method measured by MAD in sample and MSE out of sample is not
significantly affected.
Our simulation results confirm the consistency of our methods and provide
evidence of good performance in finite samples. Our estimation method performs well
for large cases with T>N, and also when N>T, as long as the number of time series
observations is larger than the number of assets in the replica portfolio. This limitation
does not constitute an important issue in practice, since in most applications, large T
are available for estimation. With only six months of daily data, for example, T=125.

3.4.

Empirical Applications

3.4.1. Tracking the S&P 500 equally weighted index
In this section, we apply our method to the construction of a replica portfolio for
the S&P 500 equality weighed index for the 2015 to 2016 period. We select daily
frequency returns, as passive funds seldom do intraday transactions. Both index and
component stock returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database. The composition changes of the index are obtained from
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Compustat. For simplicity, we only use the stocks that remained in the index
throughout the entirety of the sample period, which results in 421 stocks. We use a
rolling window for our out-of-sample analysis, with 1-year in sample and 1-month out
of sample for each roll. Thus, the first window involves 250-day in-sample data
starting from January 2015, from which the leader stocks are picked and the portfolio
weight is derived, and this trading strategy is applied to the next 21 trading days for
out-of-sample analysis. We report the estimated number of factors27, number of
leaders, and tracking performance (MEAN, STD.DEV., MAD, and SUPMOD) for
each roll, and compute the MSE, correlation, and turnover rate (Turnover) for the
whole out-of-sample period. Turnover is typically higher when a portfolio is larger, or
experiences greater adjustments in weight. Accordingly, the turnover measure is
defined as the mean absolute change in replica weights:
Turnover =

1 T N
  j ,t +1 −  j ,t
T t =1 j =1

(13)

We use the CM-2006 method to set benchmarks for out-of-sample performance,
following the parameters suggested in their paper, that is, with the explained variance
threshold set to be 99.9% and R2 threshold to be 80%. As a second benchmark, we
also use a “naïve” correlation method that simply selects a fixed number of stocks
with the highest correlation with the index return to construct the replica. We report
results with 100 stocks.
In Table 4, we report the tracking performance of our method and the two

27

We set k max = 30 as in the simulations, and this threshold is never reached in our test.
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benchmarks for each of 12 out-of-sample windows. Our method selects an average of
28 leader stocks, with a maximum of 45 stocks and a minimum of 17 stocks in the
replica portfolio. This implies that only 6.7% of the total number of stocks in the
index are needed in the replica portfolio. Even with such a small portfolio, the replica
portfolio has lower tracking errors relative to the CM-2006 and the naïve correlation
methods. In Table 4, we also report average performance of our method in
comparison with the benchmarks for the whole 12 out-of-sample window periods.
The replica portfolio constructed with the Follow-the-Leader approach performs the
best in tracking the index, with the lowest MSE among the three reported methods
(0.0635) and highest level of correlation (0.9835). The replica portfolio constructed
with the CM-2006 method has a larger MSE (0.1107) and smaller correlation.28 The
replica portfolio constructed with the naïve correlation method has a relatively low
MSE (0.0656), however, in this case, 100 stocks are needed to reach such results. As
expected, the large number of stocks affects the turnover rate for this naïve replica
(4.0452), rendering it 30% larger than the rate for the Follow-the-Leader replica
(3.1846). These results are relevant for portfolio managers, since larger turnover will
result in a higher transaction cost for the fund29.
Finally, we propose a modified practical approach that can lead to further

We also estimate the CM replica portfolio using other parameters for the explained variance threshold
and the R2 threshold. In all studied cases, MSE is larger than in the Follow-the-Leader replica portfolio.
We find that the performance of CM’s (2006) methods is very sensitive to the ad-hoc choice of
parameters, and thus it has to be carefully calibrated before implementation.
29 In unreported experiments, we also constructed a naïve replica portfolio with N=50, and as expected
the MSE in this case increases to 0.08 and the level of correlation with the index portfolio decreases to
0.96.
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reduction on the turnover rate for the Follow-the-Leader replica portfolio. For this
approach, we hold the 17 stocks picked in the 1st window (Table 4) as the base
portfolio for the following 11 windows, and we only add stocks to this base portfolio
when these 17 stocks cannot span the estimated factor space in the following
windows. In other words, the fund manager will construct a Follow-the-Leader replica
portfolio for the first month, and then simply add stocks for the following month in
case this portfolio is not able to capture all systematic risk. Under this approach, we
assume that the factors and the leader stocks that track these factors are relatively
stable over time, which we believe is a plausible assumption. Results of our modified
method are presented in Table 5 and Figure 1. As expected, our modified approach
substantially reduces turnover rate, from 3.1846 to 1.1123. Moreover, the overall
tracking error and correlation with the index improve as well, to MSE=0.0528 and
correlation equal to 0.9832. With the 17 stocks of the first window held in the
portfolio, the average number of leaders needed to capture systematic risk also
decreases, from 28 to 23.

3.4.2. Tracking the MSCI USA Small Cap index
Our second empirical application focuses on replication of the MSCI USA Small
Cap index for the 2016 to 2019 period. This application differs with the replication of
the S&P 500 equally weighted index in three aspects. First, we now focus on a
portfolio with a larger number of assets. The MSCI USA Small Cap index is designed
to measure the performance of the small cap segment of the US equity market, which
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represents approximately 14% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in the
US and includes around 1,700 constituents every year. Second, this index includes
assets that are, on average, less liquid that the ones in the S&P500 index. Third, our
empirical application now includes a longer time period, from 2016 to 2019. Index
composition and weights are obtained from the MSCI website, and for simplicity, we
only include the stocks that remained in the index throughout the entirety of the
sample period, which results in 1391 stocks30. Stock returns are obtained from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We use a rolling window for
our out-of-sample analysis, with 2-year in sample and 1-month out of sample for each
roll. Thus, the first window involves 504-day in sample data starting from January
2016, from which the leader stocks are selected and the portfolio weight is derived,
and this trading strategy is applied to the next 21 trading days for out-of-sample
analysis. Simulation results are reported in Table 6, and are given in comparison with
the CM-2006 method, with the explained variance threshold to be 99.9% and R2
threshold to be 80%, and with the “naïve” correlation method, using the 80 stocks
most correlated with the index. We also provide a visual comparison of the index with
the replica portfolio in Figure 2. The Follow-the-Leader method produces superior
results relative to other methods. In comparison with CM-2006, our method reduces
the MSE by approximately 20%, from 0.0569 to 0.0475. The variability of the MAD
is also lower, and turnover is approximately 40% lower. In comparison with the naïve

Weights for the dropped stocks are divided among the remaining stocks. In general, each one represents
less than 0.05%, and when divided by the 1391 stocks remaining in the index, their effects are
insignificant.
85
30

correlation method that uses 80 stocks in the replica portfolio, our method produces
similar MSE with half of the Turnover, using 38 leader stocks on average.

3.5.

Conclusion and Discussion
We propose a new factor-based method for index tracking with limited stocks.

Our method employs a formal procedure for asset selection, and is therefore immune
to the parameter sensitivity issues that arise in other methods as a result of heuristic
selection rules. Our procedure is financially intuitive since it is based on the
estimation of risk factors. Furthermore, it is easy to execute and does not require
burdensome computational algorithms.
Our Monte Carlo experiments and empirical exercises show that the estimated
index replica that captures all systematic pricing components is able to track the
underlying index with very small tracking errors. Our empirical tests show that we
can track the equal weight S&P 500 index, composed of 421 stocks, using an average
of only 28 leader stocks, and with very low mean square errors relative to previously
proposed methods. In the case of the MSCI USA Small Cap index, composed of 1391
stocks, we find that only an average of 38 leader assets is needed to accurately track
the index. We document that the selected leaders are stable over time, and thus, that
our method can provide important transaction cost savings due to a low turnover
needed for replication.
The practical advantages of our method are mainly twofold, the automation of
the asset-selecting process (free from worries about parameter sensitivity) and the
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reduction of the transaction cost (through replicating a large index with a small subset
of asset). This method can be applied in replicating any index, however, it will add
most value to passive funds that find full replication costly or infeasible, such as
tracking a large index or an index including illiquid assets like small-cap stocks or
corporate bonds.
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Tables and Figures for Essay Two
Table 1: Monte Carlo Simulations: Follow-the-Leader vs CM-2006
The table reports the average measures of tracking performance for replica portfolios constructed in
accordance with the Follow-the-Leader and CM-2006 approaches as described in the text. For the insample case, we generate data with 100 assets for 500 periods and estimate the assets in the replica
portfolio and their weights. For the out-of-sample case, we generate additional data for the 100 assets
over an additional 500 periods and use the assets and weights estimated from the in-sample data.
Replica portfolios for the CM-2006 methods are constructed with the number of factors determined by
explained variance cut offs at 99.9% and 90%. We report average statistics for 1,000 simulations and
their corresponding Monte Carlo standard errors in parentheses. MEAN is the mean error of
replications, STD.DEV. the standard deviation, MAD the mean absolute deviation, SUPMOD the
supremum of the modulus, Factors the average estimated number of factors, Leaders the estimated
average number of assets in the portfolio, MSE the mean squared error, and Correl. the correlation
coefficient between index and replica.

Follow-the-Leader
In sample (T=[1,500])
MEAN
0.0000
(0.0004)
STD.DEV.
0.1426
(0.0179)
MAD
0.1137
(0.0144)
SUPMOD
0.4645
(0.0763)
Nfactors
10.0000
(0.0000)
Nleaders
30.0320
(2.7609)
Out of sample (T=[501, 1000])
MEAN
-0.0003
(0.0445)
STD.DEV.
0.1536
(0.0195)
MAD
0.1272
(0.0199)
SUPMOD
0.5115
(0.0879)
MSE
0.0071
(0.0011)
Correl.
0.9998
(0.0002)

CM-2006
EV cutoff at 99.9%

CM-2006
EV cutoff at 90%

0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0218
(0.0444)
0.0173
(0.0354)
0.0710
(0.1474)
45.1510
(13.3892)
95.4040
(11.0503)

0.3286
(7.7024)
7.1326
(71.9540)
6.2544
(57.6602)
23.6025
(270.8345)
3.0400
(0.6425)
3.5550
(1.1800)

0.0004
(0.0135)
0.0269
(0.0468)
0.0222
(0.0383)
0.0903
(0.1632)
0.0012
(0.0022)
1.0000
(0.0002)

-3.4493
(131.5669)
11.6491
(139.4152)
14.9012
(157.8817)
39.7893
(460.3028)
0.8421
(0.2623)
0.7881
(8.5492)
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Table 2: Finite Sample Performance of the Follow-the-Leader Approach
The table reports the average measures of tracking performance across 1,000 simulations of replica
portfolios constructed through the Follow-the-Leader approach for different numbers of assets (N) and
time series observations (T). MEAN is the mean error of replications, STD.DEV. the standard
deviation, MAD the mean absolute deviation, SUPMOD the supremum of the modulus, Factors the
average estimated number of factors, Leaders the average estimated number of leaders, MSE the mean
squared error, and Correl. the average correlation coefficient between index and replica. Monte Carlo
standard errors are reported in parentheses. For in-sample results, we generate data with N assets for T
periods, and estimate the assets in the replica portfolio and their weights. For the out-of-sample, results
we generate additional data with N assets for T periods, and use the assets and weights estimated from
the in-sample data.

In sample
N
T
Factors
50 125 10.00
(0)
50 250 10.00
(0)
50 500 10.00
(0)
100 125 10.00
(0)
100 250 10.00
(0)
100 500 10.00
(0)
125 50
10.00
(0)
250 50
10.00
(0)
500 50
10.00
(0)
125 100 10.00
(0)
250 100 10.00
(0)
500 100 10.00
(0)
125 250 10.00
(0)
250 250 10.00
(0)
500 250 10.00
(0)

Leaders
20.99
(5.7635)
20.82
(3.3932)
21.26
(2.7587)
21.77
(2.4772)
26.95
(2.6954)
30.03
(2.7609)
49.58
(20.697)
120.61
(18.019)
157.07
(6.8939)
21.78
(2.4939)
26.97
(2.7889)
29.49
(2.7421)
29.14
(2.75839)
35.40
(2.8821)
45.34
(3.16477)

MEAN
STD.DEV. MAD
SUPMOD
-0.0011
0.2001
0.1596
0.5544
(0.0244)
(0.3635)
(0.3187)
(0.8144)
0.0000
0.1861
0.1481
0.5662
(0.0005)
(0.0592)
(0.0468)
(0.1949)
0.0000
0.1815
0.1446
0.5861
(0.0005)
(0.0394)
(0.0314)
(0.1426)
0.0000
0.1757
0.1393
0.4942
(0.0005)
(0.0408)
(0.0326)
(0.1329)
0.0000
0.1514
0.1205
0.4566
(0.0004)
(0.0221)
(0.0178)
(0.079)
0.0000
0.1426
0.1137
0.4645
(0.0004)
(0.0179)
(0.0144)
(0.0763)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.0000
0.1699
0.1346
0.4681
(0.0005)
(0.0383)
(0.0305)
(0.1221)
0.0000
0.1358
0.1076
0.3735
(0.0004)
(0.0252)
(0.02)
(0.0873)
0.0000
0.1217
0.0963
0.3348
(0.0003)
(0.0199)
(0.016)
(0.0697)
0.0000
0.1437
0.1143
0.4354
(0.00038) (0.02057) (0.01647) (0.08035)
0.0000
0.1246
0.0992
0.3789
(0.00032) (0.01521) (0.01213) (0.06483)
0.0000
0.1020
0.0811
0.3081
(0.00026) (0.01061) (0.00853) (0.04677)
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Table 2, continues
Out of sample
N
T
MEAN
STD.DEV. MAD
SUPMOD MSE
Correl.
50 125
-0.0089
0.2386
0.2126
0.7145
0.0235
0.9964
(0.1362)
(0.2185) (0.1945)
(0.5363) (0.0207) (0.0257)
50 250
-0.0064
0.2057
0.1747
0.6529
0.0138
0.9991
(0.0791)
(0.0639) (0.0575)
(0.2126) (0.0045) (0.0013)
50 500
0.0017
0.1916
0.1585
0.6364
0.0089
0.9997
(0.0562)
(0.0418) (0.0385)
(0.1556) (0.0021) (0.0004)
100 125
-0.0059
0.2220
0.1977
0.6678
0.0219
0.9977
(0.1163)
(0.0522) (0.0607)
(0.1879) (0.0064) (0.0024)
100 250
0.0005
0.1735
0.1472
0.5488
0.0116
0.9994
(0.0648)
(0.0256) (0.0278)
(0.1099) (0.0021) (0.0006)
100 500
-0.0003
0.1536
0.1272
0.5115
0.0071
0.9998
(0.0445)
(0.0195) (0.0199)
(0.0879) (0.0011) (0.0002)
125 100
-0.0027
0.2295
0.2100
0.6882
0.0260
0.9970
(0.1377)
(0.0537) (0.0703)
(0.2001) (0.0081) (0.0028)
250 100
0.0025
0.1981
0.1798
0.5906
0.0222
0.9978
(0.1155)
(0.0392) (0.0571)
(0.1607) (0.0065) (0.0021)
500 100
0.0014
0.1844
0.1685
0.5507
0.0208
0.9980
(0.1090)
(0.0324) (0.0497)
(0.1326) (0.0056) (0.0018)
-0.0027
0.1668
0.1422
0.5338
0.0112
0.9994
125 250
(0.064986) (0.02404) (0.02735)
(0.1069) (0.00207) (0.0005)
-0.0039
0.1485
0.1264
0.4738
0.0100
0.9996
250 250
(0.057252) (0.01853) (0.02303) (0.08695) (0.00171) (0.00041)
-0.0040
0.1278
0.1088
0.4085
0.0086
0.9997
500 250
(0.049002) (0.01329) (0.0178) (0.07081) (0.00133) (0.00029)
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Table 3: The effect of Weak Factors
The table reports the average measures of tracking performance for replica portfolios constructed in
accordance with the Follow-the-Leader approach when some factors are weak (low signal to noise
ratio=0.17). In the Baseline case, factors are estimated as in Table 1, and then data generation is
modified to generate 1, 2 and 3 weak factors. For each case, we report average statistics for 1,000
simulations, and report their corresponding Monte Carlo standard errors in parentheses. MEAN is the
mean error of replications, STD.DEV. the standard deviation, MAD the mean absolute deviation,
SUPMOD the supremum of the modulus, Factors the estimated number of factors, Leaders the
estimated number of assets in the portfolio, MSE the mean squared error, and Correl the correlation
coefficient between index and replica.

Baseline:
no weak factors
In sample (T=[1,500])
MEAN
0.0000
(0.0004)
STD.DEV.
0.1426
(0.0179)
MAD
0.1137
(0.0144)
SUPMOD
0.4645
(0.0763)
Factors
10.0000
(0.0000)
Leaders
30.0320
(2.7609)
Out of sample (T=[501, 1000])
MEAN
-0.0003
(0.0445)
STD.DEV.
0.1536
(0.0195)
MAD
0.1272
(0.0199)
SUPMOD
0.5115
(0.0879)
MSE
0.0071
(0.0011)
Correl
0.9998

1 weak factor

2 weak factors

3 weak factors

0.0000
(0.0004)
0.1454
(0.0189)
0.1158
(0.0151)
0.4703
(0.077)

0.0000
(0.0004)
0.1478
(0.0206)
0.1178
(0.0165)
0.4787
(0.0832)

0.0000
(0.0004)
0.1509
(0.022)
0.1202
(0.0176)
0.4902
(0.0878)

10.0000
(0.0000)

10.0000
(0.0000)

10.0000
(0.0000)

29.3510
(2.6651)

28.7730
(2.7146)

28.1180
(2.7415)

-0.0002
(0.0443)
0.1565
(0.0205)
0.1294
(0.0209)
0.5182
(0.087)
0.0072
(0.0011)
0.9998

0.0000
(0.0447)
0.1590
(0.0222)
0.1313
(0.0226)
0.5318
(0.0988)
0.0073
(0.0012)
0.9998

0.0027
(0.0479)
0.1617
(0.0236)
0.1339
(0.0247)
0.5418
(0.1047)
0.0075
(0.0013)
0.9998
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Table 4: Tracking the S&P 500 equally weighted index
This table reports out-of-sample performance of tracking portfolios constructed in accordance with the Follow-theLeader method, CM-2006 method, and a naïve correlation method. The tracking index is the S&P 500 equally
weighed index, with daily returns for the period 2015-2016. For the CM-2006 method, the threshold of explained
variance is set at 99.9%. The naïve correlation method chooses the 100 stocks with the highest correlation with the
index. We report the number of Factors (Factors), the number of Leaders (Leaders), and the mean absolute
deviation (MAD) for each window. We also report average statistics for the 12 windows as the mean squared error
(MSE), the correlation coefficient between index and replica (Correl), and the turnover rate of the replica
(Turnover). For each rolling window, we use 250 trading days as in sample, and the next 21 trading days as out of
sample.

Window

Follow-the-Leader
Factors Leaders
MAD

Factors

CM-2006
Leaders
MAD

1st
5
17
0.5239
5
8
2nd
5
20
2.1593
6
12
3rd
6
29
0.2058
6
11
4th
6
31
0.879
5
9
5th
6
25
0.3857
5
10
6th
7
27
0.3165
6
14
7th
7
26
1.0982
6
14
8th
7
25
0.7742
5
9
9th
7
31
0.428
5
10
10th
7
29
0.4875
5
9
11th
7
45
0.3502
5
8
12th
8
30
0.8669
6
14
Overall out-of-sample performance for all 12 windows
Follow-the-Leader approach
CM-2006
MSE
0.0635
0.1107
Correl.
0.9835
0.9154
Turnover
3.1846
2.9834
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1.3599
0.705
0.3373
0.5489
1.6513
0.4724
0.758
1.4195
2.2218
1.4753
3.3583
1.1037

Naïve correl.
Leader
s

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

MAD

0.8945
0.7392
0.8959
0.4483
0.5733
0.525
0.3242
0.764
1.1175
0.4173
2.2692
0.2479

Naï
ve correlation

0.0656
0.9688
4.0452

Table 5: Tracking S&P 500 equally weighted index - holding the initial portfolio
This table reports out-of-sample index tracking performance of the Follow-the-Leader method with the firstwindow portfolio stocks kept to the rest of the 11 windows. For the 2 nd to 12th windows, more leader stocks are
added to the portfolio only when the stocks picked in the 1st window cannot span the risk factors. MEAN is the
mean error of replications, STD.DEV. the standard deviation, MAD the mean absolute deviation, SUPMOD the
supremum of the modulus, Factors the estimated number of factors, Leaders the estimated number of leaders, MSE
the mean squared error, Correl the simple correlation between index and replica, and Turnover the turnover rate of
the replica. The sample period is 2015-2016. For each rolling window, we use 250 trading days as in sample, and
the next 21 trading days as out of sample.

Out-of-sample performance for each window
Follow-the-Leader approach - hold 1st-window portfolio to the rest of the
Window
windows
Factors
Leaders
MEAN
STD
MAD
SUPMOD
1st
5
17
-0.2985
0.5339
0.5239
1.1269
2nd
5
19
-0.1309
0.4035
0.3313
0.8289
3rd
6
22
-0.7748
0.3722
0.7848
1.2060
4th
6
22
-1.7749
0.5975
1.7749
2.4722
5th
6
22
0.6788
0.2541
0.6788
1.0873
6th
7
24
-0.0536
0.2122
0.1890
0.3626
7th
7
24
0.5626
0.4251
0.6141
1.2422
8th
7
25
0.1517
0.1621
0.1758
0.4126
9th
7
24
-0.4244
0.2557
0.4380
0.8652
10th
7
23
0.1822
0.4640
0.3733
1.1038
11th
7
26
-0.2523
0.5894
0.4439
1.5249
12th
8
27
1.1011
0.7034
1.1184
1.9251
Out-of-sample performance for all 12 windows
MSE
0.0528
Correl
0.9832
Turnover
1.1123
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Table 6: Tracking MSCI US SMALL CAP index
This table reports out-of-sample index tracking performance of the Follow-the-Leader method, CM-2006 method,
and the naïve correlation method for the US SMALL CAP index, with monthly returns for the period 2016-2019.
In this case, the Follow-the-Leader method has the first-window portfolio stocks kept to the rest of the 23 windows.
For the 2nd to 24th windows, more leader stocks are added to the portfolio only when the stocks picked in the 1 st
window cannot span the risk factors. For the CM-2006 method, the threshold of explained variance is set at 99.9%.
The naïve correlation method chooses the 80 stocks with the highest correlation with the index. We report the
number of Factors (Factors), the number of Leaders (Leaders), and the mean absolute deviation (MAD) for each
window. We also report average statistics for the 24 windows as the mean squared error (MSE), the correlation
coefficient between index and replica (Correl), and the turnover rate of the replica (Turnover). For each rolling
window, we use 504 trading days as in sample, and the next 21 trading days as out of sample.

Follow-the-Leader
Window
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th
19th
20th

Factor
s
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Leaders MAD
31
32
35
125
33
32
33
34
34
32
32
32
33
35
35
34
35
35
35
35

1.1383
0.5303
0.2464
0.2350
0.6986
1.3110
1.0897
2.6919
1.0718
0.9855
1.4960
0.3741
0.4708
0.3681
0.7249
0.5453
1.2239
0.6017
0.5182
0.6565

CM (2006)
Factor
s
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
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Leader
s
12
14
10
9
9
9
8
8
8
9
8
12
10
7
7
12
12
13
12
9

MAD
1.7824
1.6109
0.3073
0.6414
2.7488
0.9359
0.5076
1.4234
0.9122
0.5925
0.3789
0.3205
0.3424
1.1250
0.9100
0.5264
0.7443
0.5198
0.9560
1.5341

Naïve
correlation
Leader MAD
s
80
0.5650
80
1.2931
80
0.2695
80
0.6323
80
0.9933
80
1.1226
80
0.3662
80
2.0886
80
0.9675
80
1.2817
80
1.4956
80
1.4345
80
0.2685
80
0.8114
80
0.8199
80
0.2765
80
1.7108
80
0.7468
80
0.3298
80
0.2500

21st
4
36
0.4264
6
11
1.2150
22nd
4
37
0.3476
6
11
0.5379
23rd
4
37
0.5668
6
10
0.8793
24th
5
36
0.5687
6
9
2.0488
Overall out-of-sample performance for all 24 windows
Follow-the-Leader
CM (2006)
approach
MSE
0.0475
0.0569
Correl.
0.9325
0.9281
Turnover
1.7218
3.0095

98

80
80
80
80

0.7398
0.7605
0.3712
0.2789

Naïve correlation
0.0483
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Figure 1: Tracking the S&P 500 equally weighed index
The figure shows the tracking performance of the Follow-the-Leader method. The S&P 500 equally weighed index
is in blue (Index) and the Follow-the Leader-Replica is in red (tracking portfolio) for the 12-month out-of-sample
period. The replica is constructed with the Follow-the-Leader
V1 vs. Index method as in Table 5.
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Figure 2: Tracking the MSCI US SMALL CAP index
The figure shows the tracking performance of the Follow-the-Leader method. The US SMALL CAP index is in
blue (Index) and the Follow-the-Leader-Replica is in red (tracking portfolio) for the 24-month out-of-sample period
of 2018-2019. The replica is constructed with the Follow-the-Leader method as in Table 6.
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Chapter 4: Essay Three

Price Discovery in Option Panels:
Evidence from S&P 500 Index Options

101

Abstract
This paper investigates how market completeness influences the price discovery process
in the option market. Specifically, we study how the introduction of new option contracts on the
S&P 500 index has changed the way this option market incorporates new information. Using a
novel methodology, we quantify the daily contribution of an individual option contract to price
discovery. Our results show dramatic changes during the sample period between 2004 and
2018. We document an important shift in price discovery from call to put options, and from
long-term contracts to short-term contracts. Our results also suggest that due to market
frictions, market completion does not immediately lead to changes in information shares.

Keywords: Price discovery, Index option, Information Share, Market Completeness, Market
Efficiency
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4.1

Introduction
Financial markets play a distinctive role in the economy as venues where asset prices

incorporate new information through trading. This price discovery process is crucial for market
participants wishing to invest at fair valuations and at low costs. Never simple, price discovery
is particularly challenging in modern financial markets, where a multiplicity of security contracts
implies that information is spread across many contracts. In particular, technological advances
and market innovations have made option markets a venue in which hundreds and even thousands
of contracts are available to trade, all of them linked to the same underlying security.
The introduction of new option contracts contributes to the efficiency of the market, as a
wider range of investment states is available to investors (Ross, 1976). In an option market with
rational investors and absent of any frictions, market completion would facilitate price discovery
as investors tailor their investment strategies with newly listed contracts. In practice, financial
frictions could make this process differ across contracts, so price discovery will tend to occur
first in contracts with the highest net profit (Easly et al. 1998). As a result of market frictions,
market completion could not necessarily lead to immediate efficiency gains, since new
investment states would remain inaccessible. For example, high liquidity costs could prevent
informed traders from using new contracts, and absence of electronic trading system in early days
could hinder informed trading flow from electronic traders.
In this paper, we empirically assess how market completeness influences the price discovery
process. Specifically, we study how the introduction of new option contract expirations for the
S&P 500 index (weeklys introduced in 2005, quarterlys introduced in 2007, end-of-months
introduced in 2014, and Monday/Wednesday weeklys introduced in 2016) has changed the
information incorporation in this market. The staggered introduction of these contracts provides
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a rich set up to study different levels of market completeness, as the panel of available options
increases through time. To quantify the relative information share of an option in the panel, we
propose a methodology to efficiently measure this quantity. To our knowledge, this is the first
study to empirically illustrate the effect of market completion on price discovery.
Option contracts derive their value from the future states of the underlying asset in the
contract, so they constitute a unique source to isolate informative price movements about this
asset. The importance of option markets in the price discovery process of the underlying asset
resides on several factors. First, Black (1975) argues that the embedded leverage in option
contracts facilitates trading for informed traders facing capital constraints. Second, options
enhance welfare by completing markets (Ross, 1976), so increasing the availability of option
contracts to informed traders allows them to select different contracts and construct complex
strategies from these securities. As documented in Chakravarty et al. (2004) and Rourke (2013),
option contracts of diverse characteristics impound differently new information related to future
stock prices. Moreover, the availability of new options featuring sequential issuance of contracts
expiring one week apart has allowed investors to control exposure to specific risks associated
with price jumps (Andersen et al., 2017). Third, Figlewski and Webb (1993) and Lin and Lu
(2015) argue that trading in options can relax short-sale constraints by allowing investors to take
positions in options, thus enabling informed traders to circumvent such restrictions in the
underlying asset.
A methodological complication for price discovery analyses in option markets is the size of
the panel. Standard methodologies to account for the information share of a security, like the one
proposed in Hasbrouck (1995), are not suited to handle this large cross-section of contracts. These
methodologies decompose price changes into innovations in the fundamental value (a permanent
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component) and in a noise component (a temporary shock). The information share (IS) of
different price series is then determined by looking at the share of common innovation variance
that is explained by each price series. The IS parameters are typically computed from reduced
form errors of a vector error correction model (VECM), which relies on a Cholesky factorization.
This step makes the computation of IS dependent on the ordering of the series, so with a large set
of observations, the number of possible orderings increases exponentially and the calculations
become infeasible. Nonetheless, there is an extensive literature that has successfully used largedimension common factor models (see Bai and Ng, 2008 for a complete review on the topic) to
adapt the computation of IS from a large cross-section of price series.
We build on the work of Westerlund et al. (2017) and use a factor analytical approach to
isolate the amount of variation explained by individual time-series in a panel of option prices.
The advantage of this method lies in the estimation of unobservable factors from a large crosssection of observations, which is perfectly suited for the large dimensional nature of option panels.
To estimate the information share of an option for a given day, we first employ intraday option
data to obtain an imperfect proxy of the underlying's unobservable efficient price, similar in spirit
to the martingale restriction used in Longstaff (1995). Using these implied prices, we construct a
balanced panel and use the factor analytical approach of Westerlund et al. (2017) to compute
daily estimates of individual options' IS. By pooling hundreds of observations across maturities
and moneyness, our approach offers a first-time view of the information structure within a panel
of options on the S&P 500 index.
Using this method, we estimate daily IS from July 2004 to December 2018. Our results
evidence two significant changes in the incorporation of information. First, a shift of information
from calls to puts: in the start of the sample, we observe a relative balanced distribution of
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information between the two types of contracts, with about 51% of the IS contained in call options.
This proportion steadily moves towards put options, as these contracts impound over 70% of the
total information in the panel by the end of the sample. Second, a transfer of information from
long-term contracts to short-term contracts. In the beginning of the sample period, long-term
contracts (contracts with more than 60 days to maturity) account for 52% of IS, while short-term
contracts (contracts expiring in 30 days or less) do so for only 22%. These proportions gradually
move over time, and during the last year of the sample, we observe that only 20% of the IS comes
from long-term contracts, while 55% comes from short-term contracts. The previous structural
changes are not observable when we use existent market measures such as volume, number of
contracts, and number of option maturities, which speaks about the economic importance of the
proposed methodology to understand price dynamics in the option market.
To further shed light on the structural changes that have affected option markets, we use the
introduction of new contract expirations to investigate the effects of market completeness on
price discovery. Ross (1976) shows theoretically introducing new options contracts that enhances
market completeness will lead to increase in market efficiency. However, empirical studies on
how information content changes during the market completion process is scarce. We pinpoint
the dates for the introduction of 4 types of SP500 index options (weeklys introduced in 2005,
quarterlys introduced in 2007, end-of-months introduced in 2014, and Monday/Wednesday
weeklys introduced in 2016, details in Appendix). Overall, we do not observe immediate
structural changes of IS after the introduction dates. Instead, we observe a slow and gradual
process that takes years for IS to shift from existing contracts to new type of contracts. For
instance, Weekly contracts are introduced in 2005, but they do not see significant change in their
information share until 2010, when it starts to grow from 2% IS to 48% in 2018. This indicates
that changes in the incorporation of new information from market completion is not immediate,
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but rather, that it is a process that happens progressively and depends on the transactional
efficiency of the market.
To understand what type of information is impounded in option contracts, we conduct yearby-year beta regressions of our IS measure on several variables that capture different aspects of
the underlying asset behaviour. We find that the S&P 500 index volatility is associated with a
decrease of IS for calls throughout the sample, showing that shocks to this type of risk are less
likely to be incorporated through call option prices. In addition, we find that the leverage effect,
the correlation between the underlying volatility and its return, is associated with an increase in
IS for short-term puts. Thus, the previous two results suggest that information about underlying
asset dynamics are distinctly incorporated in option prices.
Price discovery studies using option data typically ignore how information is distributed
across option contracts, and center the discussion on whether the option market leads or lags the
underlying asset market (e.g. the stock). The methodologies used in this literature vary greatly,
and results are mixed. On one hand, several studies employ quantities computed from option
markets to study subsequent information about underlying asset values. For instance, variables
such as abnormal trading volume and order imbalance can predict future stock returns (see for
instance Johnson and So, 2012; Lin and Lu, 2015; Ge et al., 2016). In Amaya et al. (2022),
variables from intraday option prices are used to explain future volatility and returns on the S&P
500 index. On the other hand, a different group of studies explicitly quantify where price
discovery occurs, some of them finding a small or even negligible role to option prices (see
Muravyev et al., 2013) and others finding considerable information in these prices (Chakravarty
et al., 2004; Rourke, 2013; Patel et al., 2020). We add to this literature by investigating how price
discovery happens within the option market, and documenting structural changes across time,
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providing a complementary view to the existent literature.
We also contribute to the literature that studies the measurement of price discovery in
financial markets. The term we use, information share, originates from the breakthrough work of
Hasbrouck (1995)and has been applied in many empirical studies such as Harris, McInish, and
Wood (2002) and Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) on US equities and European equities crosslisted in the US market, De Jong, Mahieu, and Schotman (1998) and Covrig and Melvin (2002)
on the foreign exchange market, Mizrach and Neely (2008) on the US Treasury market, and
Dittmar, and Yuan (2008) for corporate and sovereign bonds in emerging markets. Despite its
popularity, Hasbrouck information share is not without drawbacks, one being difficulty to obtain
standard errors for inference, another being overparametrization and requiring suitable
identifying restrictions due to the VECM model setting (Karabiyik et al., 2021). As a remedy,
Harris et al. (2002) recommended an alternative measure, known as component share and become
as popular as Hasbrouck information share. This method enables asymptotically standard
inference but still suffer from overparametrization. Other than these two main measures, there're
other advances in this area. Among them is Westerlund et al. (2017), the paper we follow in our
work, who incorporates the latest advances in factor model literature for large dimension data
and develops a simple method allowing information share computation for large dimensions that
the original method can't do. This method solves the overparametrization problem in Hasbrouck
information share and make computation feasible for large panel data that empirical analysis
usually encounters. We further modify the method to make it applicable to large-dimension price
discovery problem in options market and thus add to this stream of literature.
Our paper differs from previous studies on market completeness, as these works are mainly
theoretical (see Staum, 2007). A market is complete when all risk factors are traded and perfect
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risk transfer is possible. Classic theories assumes a complete market yet in practice, markets are
never complete. Thus, many studies focus on relaxing the classic complete market assumption,
such as option valuation in incomplete markets (e.g., EI Karoui and Quenez, 1995; Henderson,
2007) and portfolio optimization in incomplete markets (see Skiadas, 2006). Empirical studies
on options market completion have studied the impact of option listing on the spot market
volatility (e.g., Damodaran and Lim, 1991; Mayhew, 1999; Mayhew and Mihov, 2004) and spot
market quality (Kumar et al., 1998). In this paper, we revisit the classic work of Ross (1976), and
look at a series of market completion events to understand changes in market efficiency, in particular, the way information in incorporated in newly introduced contracts. Does market efficiency
responds immediately to new contract introduction or does it take time to happen? This is by
nature an empirical question that we answer in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the institutional
background of the market completion process for S&P500 index options. Section 4.3 introduces
our price discovery model that derives information share measure. Section 4.4 presents our
dataset and the estimation method of our information share measure. Section 4.5 lays out the
empirical analysis and findings and Section 4.6 concludes the paper.

4.2 Institutional Background: New Options Introduction for S&P500 Index Options
Market
In this section, we document the introduction of new option contracts for SP500 index. We
illustrate such the events in Figure 1, where the total volume of SP500 index options from 2004
to 2018 is represented by the blue line, and the event dates are represented by the vertical lines.
The data include all available SP500 index options from Option Metrics.

109

The nowadays very popular SPX weeklys were initially introduced on October 28, 2005 31 .
They were created for customers who target opportunities tied to specific market events, such as
earnings and government reports . However, they didn't draw much attention upon introduction,
as we can see in Figure 1 there is only a small increase in overall volume around October 2005.
As the standard SP500 index options (i.e. the monthly-traded SPX), the weeklys traded solely
in open outcry initially. It's not until the December 2, 2010 that weeklys transit from AM-settled
to PM-settled, and from solely open outcry to a hybrid trading model, which incorporates
electronic and open outcry trading on one exchange. Note that two events happened at the same
time. First, the transition to a hybrid trading model enabled electronic trading which catered the
point-and-click customers . Second, the transition from AM-settlement to PM-settlement helped
reduce the gap risk arising from overnight price change32 . In Figure 1, we don't see an immediate
increase in overall trading volume on December 2010, but we do see a substantial rise in the
following semi-year.
Weeklys have also seen more maturities available over time. When weeklys are first
introduced in 2005, they were all listed on Fridays and would expire on the following Friday. On
July 1, 2010, CBOE expands weekly options by one day (that is, weeklys were listed on
Thursdays instead of Fridays, and would still expire on the following Friday), which allows
traders to more easily ”roll” from one weekly expiration to another. Still, weeklys were only

31

The exact date for weekly introduction, Oct 28, 2005, is found by first collecting the rough range of the time
of the introduction, i.e. Oct 2005, from CBOE (Cboe Global Markets, Inc.) website and anecdotal evidence, and
then from this range checking Option Metrics data for the exact date. Specifically, we download all available
SPX options data on Option Metrics and group the data by date and maturity. We observe that one additional
maturity shows up in Oct 28, 2005 compared to the previous day, Oct 27, 2005, and this added one has 7 days to
maturity, perfectly matching the definition of a weekly option. We use this way to pin down other dates too when
the news source does not provide a specific event date.
32
The downside to European options is that they settle on the morning following their last trading day - which
creates overnight risk: if the underlying being used were to gap at the open from where it closed the night before
- it is possible that option traders who carried open positions overnight could get burned and suffer trading losses.
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available roughly 1 week before expiration, and that's in stark contrast with weeklys nowdays
that list up to 12 consecutive weeks. When did that expansion happen? We were not able to find
the exact dates from the typical news source, and thus we turned to Option Metrics data to pin
down the dates. Specifically, we list the dates on which more maturites are observed than the
previous day, and then manually check those days and then find the first day when an additional
Friday listing is observed compared to the previous day. The specific event dates we find are as
follows: On May 31, 2012, available listing expanded from 1 week to 5 weeks; On January 16
and 29, 2014, available listing expanded to 7 and 8 weeks, respectively; From September 4 to
November 13, 2014, available listing further expanded from 9 to 12 weeks. This is not the end
of the increasing availability for weeklys as weeklys became increasingly popular. In addition to
these initial Friday-expiration weeklys, Wednesday- expiring and Monday-expiring weeklys
were introduced in February 23 and Aug 15, 2016, respectively, allowing investors to fine-tune
their trading time frames with even greater precision and flexibility. Back to Figure 1, the
expansion in listing weeklys one day earlier in July 2010 did not make much difference, while
the expansion of available listings in May 2012, January 2014 and September-November 2014
all happened with a jump in total trading volume. The overall volume around the introduction of
Monday and Wednesday weeklys fluctuated and is not clear how it responded to the events.
Compared to the quick growth of new contracts for short-dated options, the very- long-dated
options have also added available expirations but only slightly. SPX LEAPS (Long-term Equity
AnticiPation Securities), options contracts with expiration dates that are longer than one year,
listed only 2 expirations throughout 2004, and this number increased only to 3 or 4 in 2018. I
haven't found specific events from the news source. From the data, the increase seems to be an
outcome of 1) adding new expiration before one is about to expire 2) adding January expiration
to the existing June and December expiration.
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Another type of new contracts introduced are End-of-Quarter and End-of-Month contracts,
complementing the regular SPX options that typically expire on Fridays. On February 21, 200733 ,
SPX End-of-Quarter Options (or quarterlys) were introduced. As the name has suggested, the
quarterlys expire on the last trading day of each quarter to coincide with end-of-quarter
accounting practices, and have since become popular with money managers who use options to
rebalance or settle portfolios on the last day of each quarter34 . In similar spirit, on July 7, 2014,
SPX End-of-Month Options (or EOMs) launched in response to requests from asset managers
who need instruments matching end-of-month fund cycles and fund performance periods. Upon
completion of this change, all PM-settled SPX option series, including those which expire at the
End-of-Week, End-of-Month and End-of-Quarter, all transacted on the Hybrid trading platform
under the symbol SPXW 35 . In Figure 1, we can see a big increase in total trading volume
concurring and in the month following the introduction of quarterlys in February 2007, and a
small increase around the launch of EOMs in July 2014.

4.3

Model and Information Share Measure
This section lays out the price discovery model and our measure of information share of

option prices. We first show how the underlying asset price in the options can be characterized
from observed option prices. Based on the option implied prices we then we present our model
for of price discovery and propose a measure of information share of an option regarding the

33

34

The date is found by checking Option Metrics data.
CBOE information circular: http://otp.investis.com/generic/sec/sec-

show.aspx?Type=pdfhaspdf=1cik=0001374310FilingId=5686685
35

CBOE regulatory circular: https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/regulation/circulars/regulatory/RG14-081.pdf
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underlying asset price.

4.3.1

Option Implied Index Price

A common restriction that arises in no-arbitrage option pricing models is that, under the riskneutral pricing measure, the expected price of the underlying asset must equal its current value.
This restriction is referred to as the martingale restriction (Longstaff, 1995), and it holds true in
a frictionless market without arbitrage opportunities. If restrictions are present, the expected price
does not necessarily equal the current price of the underlying asset, and the extent of this
divergence depends on the size of the friction affecting the option market. An implication of the
martingale restriction, whether binding or not, is that the price of a given option provides
information about the current price of the underlying asset. We build on this intuition to construct
implied index prices from options, which are obtained by inverting an option pricing model.
Denote by 𝑆𝑡 the efficient value of the underlying asset at a given point in time 𝑡 and by 𝑉𝑡
its volatility. Under the usual conditions, the arbitrage-free price on a European option at time t
is given by

𝑂𝑡 = 𝑂𝑡 (𝑆𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡 ) = 𝐸 𝑄 [𝑒 −𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) 𝐹(𝑆𝑇 , 𝐾)|𝑆𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡 ]

(1)

where 𝐹 is the payoff function at maturity 𝑇 of the option, 𝐾 the strike price, 𝑟 the constant riskfree rate, and 𝑄 a risk-neutral probability measure. Assuming that the observed option price is 𝑂𝑡
and that 𝑉𝑡 is the underlying's asset volatility, the asset value inverted from these two values can
be written as:

𝑆̃𝑡 = 𝑂𝑡 (𝑜𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡 )−1
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(2)

4.3.2

Information Share of Option Prices

In this section we introduce our model for price discovery and our measure information share
of option prices. The measurement of price discovery requires isolating informative price
movements from noise. Let 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 be the price for the underlying asset implied from option 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁 in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 as described in the previous section. Changes in 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 may be driven
by two different reasons. First informed traders may decide to trade option 𝑖, so 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 will reflect a
permanent price change due to such new information. Second, noise trading, temporary order
imbalances and other trading frictions in option 𝑖 market can also cause changes in price.
Therefore, in the short term, 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 will not necessarily coincide with the underlying efficient (true)
price of the asset (𝑆𝑖𝑡 ). Let 𝐸𝑖𝑡 be the option specific noise capturing the difference between the
true index price and the option implied price, then we can express this relation as:

𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡

(3)

Equation 3 can be used to represent a very intuitive price discovery process 36. The option implied
price 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 has two sources of innovation, shocks to the true index price 𝑆𝑡 and shocks to the optionidiosyncratic price 𝐸𝑖𝑡 . Shocks to the efficient price have a permanent effect on the option implied
price, but the effect of option-specific shocks is transitory, so 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 will adjust to the fundamental
value over time. An option market is relatively efficient in the price discovery process if it
incorporates a larger amount of fundamental shocks than other option markets. In terms of
equation 3, a given option market is more informative about the true price if its given option
implied price co-moves (or is highly correlated) with the index's true price. Additionally, such

This model is similar to a standard model of price discovery as the ones of Hasbrouck (1993); or De Jong and Schotman
(2010) where the asset prices are observed in different markets
36
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option market will be less informative if the option market-specific shocks 𝐸𝑖𝑡 have large
variability. Our measure of information share is based on this intuition.
In order to construct our measure of information share we start by expressing the model 3 as
a factor model:
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 𝐹𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡

(4)

where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆̃𝑖𝑡 , 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = ⋯ = 𝜆𝑛 = 1, and 𝐹𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 . In factor model notation, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents
the response variable, 𝜆𝑖 the factor loadings, 𝐹𝑡 the common factors, and 𝐸𝑖𝑡 the idiosyncratic
noise. The dynamics of the model are governed by 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 and 𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
where 𝜌∈(-1,1] and eit is an i.i.d. error. Notice that the model in equation 4 is not restricted to
𝜆𝑖 = 1. In the model 4 the co-movement of a given option implied price and the index's true price
will be captured by 𝜆𝑖 , and the variability of the option-specific shocks can be measured by the
variance of 𝐸𝑖𝑡 .
The option contribution to price discovery, or its information share, can be can be estimated
as the proportion of the efficient price innovation variance that can be attributed to that option37.
Specifically, in the context of our model in equation 4 we propose that information share of the
option 𝑖 can be estimated as follows:

𝐼𝑆𝑖 = ∑𝑁

−2
𝜆2𝑖 𝜎2𝜂 𝜎𝐸,𝑖

2 2 −2
𝑛=1 𝜆𝑛 𝜎𝜂 𝜎𝐸,𝑛

(5)

where 𝜎2𝜂 = 𝐸[𝜂2𝑡 ] and 𝜎2𝐸,𝑖 = 𝐸[𝐸2𝑖𝑡 ]. ISi in equation 5 represents the contribution of the option i
(numerator) with respect to the total variation of the true efficient price (denominator). It is

37

In a similar setting Hasbrouck (1995) proposes that the market's contribution to price discovery, or its
information share, can be estimated as the proportion of the efficient price innovation variance that can be
attributed to that market.
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straightforward to see that this measure intuitively captures an option market level of information
in the price discovery process. First, information share of a given option market (𝐼𝑆𝑖 ) is positively
related 𝜆2𝑖 which captures the degree of association between the implied option price and the true
option price in 4. Then, option markets with implied prices that are highly correlated with the
true index price will be more informative about the true price. Second, 𝐼𝑆𝑖 is positively related to
the ratio between the common innovation's variability 𝜎2𝜂 and the variability of option-specific
2
shocks 𝜎𝐸,𝑖
. Thus, option markets with large variability of idiosyncratic (transitory) shocks will

be less informative in the price discovery process.
First, market frictions and micro-structure effects noise can that render both prices different.
Second, the volatility 𝑉𝑡 in the option pricing model has to be estimated, which could introduce
a different source of uncertainty. Third, any option pricing model only provides a partial
description of observed prices, so there is always the possibility of model error.

4.4

Data
The prices used in this study are for the S&P 500 index European options traded at the

Chicago Board Options Exchange. Our sample starts in July 2004 and ends in December 2018,
covering some important changes in terms of availability of expiration date cycles at the short
and medium expiration spectrum. In particular, our sample contains the introduction in 2005 of
weekly options with Friday expirations, which was later extended to Monday and Wednesday
expirations in 2016. In addition, the sample also includes the addition of quarterly options in
2006, whose last day of trading corresponds to the end-of-quarter accounting practice. These
events, together with different market and economic conditions, constitute a rich sample to study
and understand the information share associated with option contracts of different maturities and
moneyness.
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We construct our sample from option contracts available on Option Metrics that have positive
volume for a given trading day. Then, we retrieve level I quote data for each option from Tick
Data, who sources information from the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA), to construct
one-minute midquotes for each day an option trades in our sample period. We only use quotes
that have bid prices higher than zero and lower than the ask price, have timestamps between 9:30
a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time, do not have any condition code, and are not eligible for
automatic execution.
We apply several filters. First, we validate data by keeping only the observations with
positive volume, positive open interest, positive implied volatility, positive bid price that is lower
than its ask price. Second, for monthly options on the same day with the same moneyness and
maturity, we use AM-settled contracts38 . Finally, we filter out non-active options by keeping
only option-day observations with trading volume larger than 5, open interest larger than 5, and
option price larger than 0.5. The total number of option-day observations in our final sample is
2,336,917.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our dataset. We report total and average daily
number of contracts traded, average daily volume and average daily percentage spread per
maturity and moneyness throughout our sample period. The way we define maturity and
moneyness groups are as follows. Two types (put or call) and three maturity ranges (ST, MT and
LT) compose the six maturity groups, where ST refers to short-term contracts with date-tomaturity (DTM) ≤ 30 days, MT refers to mediumterm with DTM∈(30,60] days, and LT refers

38

The non-AM settled monthly contracts, i.e. pm-settled monthly SPX contracts, were not introduced until
2011 under a separate symbol SPXpm. We don't use them as they have the same characteristics as the
conventional AM-settled monthly contracts except only for the settlement time but have much less volume.
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to long-term contracts with DTM> 60 days. Two types (put or call) and three moneyness ranges
(OTM, ATM and ITM) compose the six moneyness groups, where moneyness is defined based
on the standardized moneyness measure (m) following Anderson et al (2017):

𝑚=

𝑙𝑛(𝐾/𝐹𝜏 )
√𝜏𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝜏

(6)

where 𝐾 denotes strike price, 𝜏 denotes years to maturity, 𝐹𝜏 denotes the forward price for
transactions 𝜏 years into the future, and 𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑀,𝜏 denotes the (annualized) implied volatility of
the option with strike price closest to 𝐹𝜏 . Using this standardized moneyness measure, OTM
(out-of-money) options are defined as puts with m < -1 and calls with m > 1, ATM (at-themoney) options are calls and puts with -1 ≤ m ≤ 1, and ITM (in-the-money) options are puts
with m > 1 and calls with m < -1.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the statistics of the six maturity groups. We can see that for both
calls and puts, ST contracts have the largest number of contracts traded, while MT and LT
contracts have similar number of contracts traded. Similarly for average daily volume, ST
contracts show the highest volume, followed by MT and LT contracts. For liquidity cost
(measured by average percentage spread), however, ST puts, MT puts and MT calls rank the
highest (0.18, 0.17 and 0.16), while ST calls, LT puts and LT calls are lower (0.13, 0,12 and
0.12). Panel B of Table 1 presents the statistics of the six moneyness groups. OTM puts show the
largest number of traded contracts, followed by ATM calls and ATM puts. The number of
contracts for these three groups significantly outnumbers the other three groups of contracts.
However, the average daily volume for OTM puts, ATM puts and ATM calls are roughly the
same. For both calls and puts, the average percentage spread is largest for OTM options (0.37
and 0.23), much larger than ATM and ITM options (all less than 0.10).
To have a rough sense how different types of options grow over time, in Figure 2 we present
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total trading volume each year for each type of options. For maturity groups, the volume of all
six groups starts off similar in 2004, yet diverges over time. Comparing puts and calls with the
same maturity range (that is, put-ST vs. call-ST, put MT vs. call MT, and put-LT vs. call-LT), in
all three cases we can see puts grow faster than calls in volume. Comparing the three maturity
ranges within the same general type (puts or calls), we find that for both puts and calls, volume
increases most rapidly for ST contracts, then MT contracts, and lastly LT contracts (for instance,
volume of ST puts goes from 4 million in 2004 to 93 million in 2018, while volume of LT puts
only grows from 5 million in 2004 to 36million in 2018). For moneyness groups, OTM puts see
the largest volume increase (from 6 million in 2004 to 97 million in 2018), while OTM calls see
much less volume increase (from 0.93 million in 2004 to 25 million in 2018). ATM puts and
ATM calls both show significant volume increase over time. The volume evolution for ITM puts
and ITM calls, however, is almost a flat line and their volume increase neglectable compared to
other types of options. Comparing puts and calls with similar moneyness, we see from the graph
that the volume grows in similar speed for both ATM and ITM contracts, but not for OTM
contracts (OTM puts have much larger volume increase over time than OTM calls).
Though we see some type of options have larger volume increase than others, it's not
immediately clear whether these options also impound more information or contribute more to
price discovery, and that's when information share comes in.

4.5

The Information Share of Index Option Prices

4.5.1 Estimation of Information Share (IS)

To estimate the information share of an option for a given day, we first compute one-minute
implied asset prices as follows. First, for every minute during the trading day, we use the observed
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midquote of an option and the S&P 500 index value to invert the Black-Scholes model and
compute the option's implied volatility. Next, to construct the conditional implied volatility
estimate 𝑉̃𝑖,𝑡 required in Equation 2, we use the average of the previous 30 implied volatilities to
time t. Then, using the conditional volatility estimate and the midquote of the option at time t as
the two inputs in the Black-Scholes model, we proceed to invert this model and obtain the implied
index price 𝑆̃𝑖,𝑡 . This procedure is repeated for each minute between 10:00 am and 4:00 pm (the
times for which estimates of the conditional volatility are available), providing intraday implied
index values associated to each option in a given day. The resulting time series {𝑆̃𝑖,𝑡 }𝑡=1,…,360 are
used to construct the option's information share for the day using the methodology as described
below.
Estimation of the parameters in equation 5 requires transforming the factor model of equation
4 into a static factor model as follows:

𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡

(7)

where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑓𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the first differences of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑡 and 𝐸𝑖𝑡 . The model is a standard static
linear factor model, and therefore the parameter of the model can be estimated using principal
components methods developed by Bai (2003). Specifically we obtain an estimate of loadings 𝜆̂𝑖
and the factor 𝑓̂𝑡 by principal components, then since 𝑓𝑡 = 𝜂𝑡 we can estimate 𝜎𝜂2 as 𝜎̂𝜂2 =
𝑇 −1 ∑𝑇𝑡=2 𝑓̂𝑡2 . We will obtain an estimate of 𝑒𝑖𝑡 by 𝑒̂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆̂𝑖 𝑓̂𝑡 and compute 𝐸̂𝑖𝑡 =
2
2
𝑇 −1 ∑𝑇𝑡=2 𝑒̂𝑖𝑡2 . to get an estimate of 𝜎𝐸,𝑖
̂𝐸,𝑖
= 𝑇 −1 ∑𝑇𝑡=2 𝐸̂𝑖𝑡2 t. Westerlund, Reese and Narayan
i as 𝜎

(2015) show that under standard assumptions, this information shares estimator is consistent as
N and T →∞.

120

Having established the estimation method for information share (IS), we next demonstrate
the findings with our IS measure.

4.5.2

IS across Moneyness and Maturity

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of IS across moneyness and maturity groups. Notice
that not all groups have contracts trading every single day. The total number of days in our sample
is 3,603, and missing values exist for ST puts, MT puts, ST calls, MT calls, ITM puts and ITM
calls. We then look at each panel separately:
Panel A of table 2 shows the statistics for the maturity groups. We can see that ST puts and
LT puts have largest average IS (22% and 20%). ST puts also have the most volatile IS (SD=0.13).
Also notice that LT puts have no missing values and yet accounts for minimum 2% IS, while
other contracts all have days with nearly 0% IS - despite LT puts' slow increase in volume, they
always play a part in the market.
Panel B of table 2 presents the statistics for the moneyness groups. We see that ATM puts
and ATM calls have largest average IS (37% and 36%), and they're also most volatile in IS (SD
= 0.15 and 0.16, respectively). In addition, Despite the relatively small informational role of ITM
puts, ITM calls and OTM calls (average IS are 7%, 3% and 1% respectively), the distribution of
IS is right-skewed: the maximum daily IS is surprisingly high (max IS are 72%, 60% and 21%,
respectively), indicating that these normally unimportant contracts can play a big role in specific
days.
To have a general sense of which type of options overall contributes more to price discovery
or how distribution of IS across different type of options is like, we also present in Figure 3 the
pie charts of average IS in 2004 (the beginning of our sample) and 2018 (the end of our sample)
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per moneyness and maturity. The comparison for maturity groups shows a substantial IS increase
for ST puts (from 10.1% in 2004 to 40.5% in 2018), and a huge decrease in IS for both LT puts
(from 26.7% in 2004 to 13% in 2018) and LT calls (24.9% in 2004 and 6.7% in 2018). For
moneyness groups, OTM puts see a big increase in IS (from 9.4% in 2004 to 28.3% in 2018)
while ATM calls lose IS (from 40.6% in 2004 to 22.5% in 2018).

4.5.3

IS Evolution

4.5.3.1 Trends from Conventional Measures
Before we show the evolution of IS, we first present the trends observable from conventional
market measures as a benchmark. Besides the volume measure shown in Figure 2, we hereby add
another two easily-available measures that can also be used to track the evolution of different
types of contracts: number of contracts and number of maturities available.
Figure 4a shows the year-by-year plots for average daily number of contracts. We can see
that number of contracts grows exponentially for all maturity groups but in different speed. All
six maturity groups start off at similar level of number of contracts in 2004, yet diverge
increasingly after that (ST puts the fastest, then MT puts, LT puts and ST calls, lastly LT calls
and LT puts). For moneyness groups, however, Only OTM puts, ATM puts and ATM calls grow
exponentially. Their increase in number of contracts significantly outnumbers the other three
types. Overall, the growth pattern shown in number of contracts is similar to that of volume.
Figure 4b shows the year-by-year plots for average daily number of maturities. For maturity
groups, different from volume and number of contracts, the six groups do not start off at similar
level and the LT contracts ranks the highest throughout the sample. This is understandable given
that longer period to maturity renders wider range of feasible number of maturities for LT
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contracts. That said, the number of maturities of MT contracts does not outnumber that for ST
contracts over time despite their longer time to maturity. Number of maturities for ST contracts
start off almost the same as MT contracts but ST contracts prevail after 2010 and especially after
2015. This echos the dramatic growth for ST contracts that we also observe in volume and
number of contracts. For moneyness groups, contracts do not start off at similar level and end up
at different levels. ATM puts, ATM calls and OTM puts always have the largest number of
maturities (and these three lines almost completely overlap), OTM calls rank the second, then
ITM calls, and lastly ITM puts.
Figure 2 and Figure 4 taken together, the three measures in general agree on these trends for
different types of options: 1) for maturity types, ST puts grow fastest, followed by MT puts, LT
puts, ST calls, and lastly MT and LT calls, and 2) for moneyness types, OTM puts, ATM puts
and ATM calls grow the fastest, followed by OTM calls, and lastly ITM puts and ITM calls.

4.5.3.2 Trends from IS
Now we show the IS evolution, and compare that with the pattern from the benchmark
measures to see whether IS can indeed provide more insight than those easily- available market
measures.
Figure 5 presents the year-by-year plots for IS per moneyness and maturity. For maturity
groups, we see that ST puts are indeed the unicorn: they start off the lowest information share in
2004 (10%), and end up the highest information share in 2018 (41%). However, distinct from the
evolution of volume and number of contracts, the informational role for MT puts and ST calls
does not significantly increase (from 2004 to 2018, IS for MT puts only increase from 12% to
18%, ST calls from 12% to 15%) despite their significant growth in trading volume and number

123

of contracts. For LT puts, their information share even almost halves over time (27%→14%)
despite their
similar number of contracts over time as ST calls. For moneyness groups, OTM puts gain the
biggest increase in IS, However, again different from the benchmark measures, its IS is always
smaller than that of the ATM puts. ATM calls, despite similar growth in volume, number of
contracts and number of maturities as ATM puts, significantly lose IS over time (41%→23%)
while ATM calls do not. OTM calls, despite gaining more
increase in all three benchmark measures than ITM puts and ITM calls, actually play the smallest
informational role almost all the time (the only exception is 2013).
Back to the price discovery questions, we are interested in seeing which type of options lead
the price discovery process and whether the leaders change over time. From the IS evolution
shown in Figure 5, we notice two general structural changes that happen in our sample period,
which is made more evident in Figure 6:
First, the rise of puts and fall of calls. Figure 6 shows that IS for puts and calls are almost the
same in 2004, yet they diverge over time (mainly after 2010) and puts end up carrying the
majority of information content in 2018 (IS for puts grows from 49% to 72% from 2004 to 2018),
while calls only account for the rest less than 30% of information share.
Second, the rise of ST contracts and fall of LT contracts. Figure 5 shows that the IS for MT
contracts larges stay the same over time (slightly over 20%). However, IS for LT and ST contracts
has almost switched if we compare the year 2004 and 2018. IS for ST contracts rise from 22% in
2004 to 55% in 2018, while IS for LT contracts falls from 52% to 20% in 2018. The trend is
especially evident after 2010.
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Overall, Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate that IS do provide more insights in the relative
importance among different types of options that the easily-observable benchmark measures
cannot fully capture. We also document two noticeable structural change in the options
information structure during the period of 2004 to 2018.

4.5.4

Market Completeness and Information Share

One conjecture for why IS for ST contracts rise rapidly is the introduction of a specific type
of ST options currently widely used, weeklys. Weeklys are, as its name indicates, short-dated
contracts expiring one-week apart. Prior to its introduction, the typical SPX options are much
longer-dated monthly options. Andersen et al (2017) acknowledges the emergence of active
trading in the weeklys as a step toward market completion, as they improve market participants'
ability to acquire or lay off exposure to volatility and jump price risks. An interesting question
follows: how does information structure changes after the introduction of new types of options?
From the market completion perspective, we are investigating how information structure changes
in the process of market completion.
Ross(1976) shows that increased market completeness should be followed by enhancement
in market efficiency. We thus expect that the introduction of new options is followed by IS
increase in relevant options groups. Specifically, the null hypotheses are
(a) After introduction of weeklys in 2005 (or new weeklys in 2016), IS for puts remain

unchanged or drop.
(b) After introduction of weeklys in 2005 (or new weeklys in 2016), IS for ST contracts remain

unchanged or drop.
(c) After introduction of new weeklys in 2016, IS for weekly contracts remain unchanged or

drop.
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(d) After introduction of quarterlys in 2007 (or EOMs in 2014), IS for MT contracts remain

unchanged or drop.
(e) After introduction of EOMs in 2014, IS for end-of-quarter or end-of-month contracts remain

unchanged or drop.
In Appendix, we list a timeline of important dates that are more or less related to SP500 index
options. In Figure 6 we mark these event years on the graphs of IS evolution. From the graph, we
see weeklys’ transition in 2010 from AM to PM settlement and from open outcry to hybrid trading
coincides with the change of the general trend in both subplots. However, other than that the
introduction of Monday and Wednesday weeklys in 2016 coincide with larger information gap
between puts and calls, event years for new options introduction do not seem to go with the
general structural change in the informational structure. In particular, notice that weeklys are
initially introduced in October 2005 (the leftmost red dash line), and for both plots no obvious IS
trend seems to take place until 2010. Its implication for the conjecture mentioned at the beginning
of this section is, although it's possible that weeklys contributes to the rise of ST contracts, merely
the introduction of weeklys doesn't.
To make it more explicit whether and when information starts to be impounded into new
types of options, we label the types of options based on their expiration dates, and then quantify
their IS accordingly. To be specific, contracts that expire on the 3rd Friday of each month are
labelled as monthly options (the typical options traded before the introduction of other new types
of options), contracts that expires on the last trading day of either a quarter or a month are labelled
as quarterly or EOM, that expire on other Fridays than the 3rd Friday of a month are labelled as
(Friday) weeklys, and contracts that expire on either Mondays or Wednesdays are labelled as
Mon/Wed weeklys. We manually process specific cases in which holidays affect the expiration
dates.
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Figure 7 presents the IS evolution for new and old contracts with new options introduction
years marked in vertical dash lines.
We first compare weeklys with non-weeklys. The plot shows that weeklys are first
introduced in 2005, yet its information role does not significantly rise until 2010. Though we do
see an apparent turning point in 2010, the information share for weeklys overall grow gradually
and steadily throughout the sample period. Notice that the IS rise in weeklys coincide with the
rise in ST options. This result demonstrates that 1) the information structure does change in the
market completion process as new types of options contracts are introduced, and 2) such change
in information structure does not happen overnight, and it could take a long time for changes to
start to happen (nearly 5 years in this case), and even after that the increase in information share
can still happen only gradually and progressively, which adds to our understanding that market
completion does not lead to an immediate gain in efficiency.
Now we turn to all four types of contracts. For Monday and Wednesday weeklys introduced
in 2016, different from Friday weeklys, they immediately gain informational importance, and IS
for Friday weeklys decrease accordingly. This is probably because Monday/Wednesday weeklys
are very similar products as Friday weeklys and are thus substitutive. For quarterly options
introduced in July 2006 or End-of- Month options (EOMs) introduced in July 2014, however,
they show similar pattern as (Friday) weeklys. We see a time gap of around 2 years before the
end-of-quarter options start to play a part in the information structure, and gradually rise over
time, illustrating the same progressive feature. The introduction of End-of-Month options,
however, do not followed by further rise in the informational role of these types of options. It
could be that their role is overshadowed by the rapid growth of weekly options.
Overall, we observe that the informational structure in the option market changes with the
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emergence of new contracts, illustrating the transactional efficiency achieved by a more complete
market. We also observe that the change in informational structure tend to happen gradually and
progressively, rather than overnight.

4.5.5

Further Analysis

In this section, we further explore what type of information is impounded in options contracts.
To investigate that, we look at factors that have been shown to have an impact on option
prices, risk and liquidity. Risk is viewed as the sole pricing factor in classic theories. We
differentiate volatility risk and jump risk as their importance has been widely acknowledged in
option pricing literature (for example, Duffie et al, 2000). The widely- documented implied
volatility smirk reflects the asymmetry feature in risk pricing, and we thus include leverage to
capture it. On the other hand, liquidity, the extensively studied factor in market microstructure
literature, has also come into asset pricing (e.g., Cetin et al, 2006) and more recently, studies on
options market (e.g., Cao and Wei, 2010; Feng et al, 2014). They relax the assumption that
investors are price takers, complementing the classic theory by allowing investors' trades to affect
price. We capture liquidity from its two common dimensions, transaction cost and market depth.
Specifically, transaction cost is measured by percentage spread of options' price, and market
depth is measured by options' trading volume and open interest. We also control for number of
contracts.
We run the following beta regression year-by-year for each maturity group g:

𝐼𝑆𝑔,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝐴𝑔,𝑡
+𝛽5 ln (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑔,𝑡 ) + 𝛽6 ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑔,𝑡 ) + 𝛽7 ln(𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑔,𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑔,𝑡
(8)
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where 𝐼𝑆𝑔,𝑡 is the total information share for all contracts in the maturity group g on day t.
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 and 𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡 are volatility risk and jump risk of the underlying S&P500 index on day
t using oxford dataset

39

. Specifically, volatility is measured by the bipower variation (i.e.

estimator bv_ss with symbol .SPX in the oxford dataset), and jump is measured by the part of
realized variance that excesses (if it excesses) bipower variation (i.e. max(rv5_ss - bv_ss,0) using
oxford bipower variation estimator, bv_ss, and realized variance estimator, rv5_ss). leveraget is
the leverage effect measured by an integrated correlation between SP500 index return and change
of VIX for day t, computed using 1-minute intraday data following the method in Kalnina and
Xiu (2017) 40. 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝐴𝑔,𝑡 is the average percentage spread across all contracts in group g on day
t, where percentage spread is defined as (𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 )⁄𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 for each contract i.
ln (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑔,𝑡 ) is the logarithm for the total trading volume of all contracts in group g on day t.
ln (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑔,𝑡 ) + 𝛽6 is the logarithm for the total open interest (number of options positions
that has not been closed out or exercised) of all contracts in group g on day t. ln(𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑔,𝑡 )
is the logarithm of the number of contracts in group g on day t.
To estimate the coefficients, we use beta regression, a technique more suitable than OLS here
as the dependant variable, IS, is limited to the range of [0,1]. We first run the beta regression,
then for coefficients that are statistically significant at 95% confidence level, we obtain the
marginal effect of a standard deviation change in that explanatory variable on I S. We run this
regression year-by-year for all 15 years and thus obtain 15 numbers of marginal effect for each
variable for each of the six maturity groups. The regressions are only conducted on maturity

39

Data source (the Oxford-Man Institute's realised library):

https://realized.oxfordman.ox.ac.uk/documentation/estimators
40

Detailed parameter and code used for the calculation are available upon request
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groups as the two general trends observed in the previous section does not involve moneyness
groups. We present the estimation results in Figure 8.
Figure 8 shows that all factors considered have more or less impact on IS. None of the
subplots is a flat line of a consistent zero (number assigned to statistically insignificant
coefficients) marginal effect throughout the 15 years in our sample. Regarding magnitude of the
impact, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and ln(𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 ) demonstrate larger impact IS per 1 standard deviation
change than other variables: 1 standard deviation change in 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 can associate with 10%
IS change and ln(𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 ) can lead to 8.4% IS change, while other variables rarely see over
4% impact on IS. Regarding frequency of the (statistically significant) impact, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ,
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒, 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝐴 influence IS almost throughout the sample, while 𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡,
𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝 and 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 only affects IS in fewer specific years.
For specific variables, notice that 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 overall decreases IS for all call options
throughout the sample, especially in 2010 and 2015, both of which coincide with the time when
puts gain larger IS than calls. j ump tends to have the opposite effect of 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. For example,
in 2015 jump is associated with 10% IS decrease in ST puts but volatility is associated with 10%
IS increase in the same type of contracts. This validates the differentiation of volatility risk and
jump risk. Judging from the direction of the impact, volatility risk contributes to the IS trend of
rise in puts and fall in calls, while jump risk attenuates this trend. 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 shows an overall
consistent negative association with IS for ST puts and positive association with I S for MT and
LT puts. Since 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 measures the correlation between SP500 index return and VIX change
and is typically negative (market downturns tend to show higher volatility than in market upturns),
this means that the more negative the 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (the larger the leverage effect), the more
information is impounded in ST puts the less in MT or LT puts. This effect is consistent with the
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IS trend of rise in ST contracts and fall in LT contracts. The effect of 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 on IS is overall
consistently negative, which is expected: the higher the liquidity cost, the less the informed
trading and the lower the information content. 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 and 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡, if having significant
impact, are all negatively associated with IS. This is surprising from the liquidity perspective (we
expect contracts that are more liquid can impound more information). It could be that these
market depth measures confound with the amount of noise trading, which will decrease IS, or it
could be that 𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 absorbs the positive effect from liquidity. We see that 𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
positively impact ST contracts (both calls and puts) during 2004-2007 and 2010-2012 in large
magnitude, but no impact on LT contracts. This is consistent with the IS rising trend for ST
contracts especially for the period of 2010-2012 when IS of ST contracts accelerates and exceeds
that of LT contracts.
Overall, the beta regression result suggests that volatility is related to the IS trend of the rise
(fall) of puts (calls), and number of contracts and leverage effect associate with the IS trend of
the rise (fall) of ST (LT) contracts.

4.6

Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a methodology to compute the relative efficiency of option

contracts in the price discovery process of the underlying asset value. Our method differs from
existing method used in options price discovery literature in the way that it accommodates largedimension data. The large-dimension feature is critical for the current era where huge number of
contracts are easily created and traded thanks to technology advancement. In particular, we show
in this paper that this method enables price discovery study for thousands of options with the
same underlying.
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Using intraday option prices of the SP 500 index, we quantify the individual contribution of
an option in a panel of available contracts for a given day. We document how the information
share of options has significantly changed during the period of 2004 to 2018 across option types,
maturities, and moneyness. Puts and calls start off sharing similar amount of information, yet
over time puts become the major player. Long-term contracts start as the information leader, yet
over time that leader role is shifted to short-term contracts.
We use the introduction of new contract expirations to investigate the effects of market
completeness on price discovery. We observe that the informational structure in the option
market changes with the emergence of new contracts, illustrating the transactional efficiency
achieved by a more complete market. We also observe that the change in informational structure
tend to happen gradually and progressively, rather than overnight.
Finally, we explore what type of information is impounded in options contracts using beta
regressions. We find that volatility can potentially explain the rise of puts and fall of calls, and
number of contracts and leverage associate with the rise of short-term options and fall of longterm options.
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Tables and Figures for Essay Three
Table 1: Sample Description: Total and Average Daily Number of Contracts Traded,
Average Daily Volume and Average Daily Percentage Spread in 2004M7-2018M12
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the options data. Number of contracts (N
contract), trading volume (volume), and percentage spread (spread) defined as (askbid)/midprice are originally data for each options contract each day, and then aggregated
(summation or average) to the group level. Groups are divided in two ways: maturity (Panel
A) or moneyness (Panel B). Two types (put or call) and three maturity ranges (ST, MT and
LT) compose the six maturity groups, where ST refers to short-term contracts with date-tomaturity (DTM)<30 days, MT refers to medium-term with DTM∈(30,60] days, and LT
refers to long-term contracts with DTM>60 days. Two types (put or call) and three
moneyness ranges (OTM, ATM and ITM) compose the six moneyness groups, where
moneyness is defined based on the standardized moneyness measure (m) in equation (6)
following Anderson et al (2017). OTM are out-of-money options composed of puts with m
< -1 and calls with m > 1, ATM are at-the-money options composed of calls and puts with
-1 ≤ m ≤ 1, and ITM are in-the-money options composed of puts with m>1 and calls with
m <1.
Panel A: Maturity Groups
Ncontract
N contract/day
Put-ST
589,832
170
Put-MT
418,345
120
Put-LT
466,082
129
Call-ST
359,412
104
Call-MT
240,474
69
Call-LT
262,766
73
Panel B: Moneyness Groups
Ncontract
N contract/day
Put-OTM
861,992
239
Put-ATM
583,696
162
Put-ITM
28,571
9
Call-OTM
184,565
51
Call-ATM
593,970
165
Call-ITM
84,117
24
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volume/day
189157.2
109404.8
104600.0
116446.2
66230.5
59201.5

spread
0.18
0.16
0.12
0.13
0.17
0.12

volume/day
195753.4
194806.8
2254.5
39066.4
189070.0
7352.3

spread
0.23
0.06
0.05
0.37
0.09
0.03

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Daily IS in 2004M7-2018M12
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the daily information share (IS) measure per
maturity (Panel A) and moneyness (Panel B). Two types (put or call) and three maturity
ranges (ST, MT and LT) compose the six maturity groups, where ST refers to short-term
contracts with date-to-maturity (DTM)<30 days, MT refers to medium-term with DTM∈
(30,60] days, and LT refers to long-term contracts with DTM>60 days. Two types (put or
call) and three moneyness ranges (OTM, ATM and ITM) compose the six moneyness groups,
where moneyness is defined based on the standardized moneyness measure (m) in equation
(6) following Anderson et al (2017). OTM are out-of-money options composed of puts with
m < -1 and calls with m > 1, ATM are at-the-money options composed of calls and puts with
-1 ≤ m ≤ 1, and ITM are in-the-money options composed of puts with m>1 and calls with
m <1.
Panel A: Maturity Groups
N(days) Mean
Put-ST
3,463
0.22
Put-MT
3,498
0.16
Put-LT
3,603
0.20
Call-ST
3,463
0.16
Call-MT
3,498
0.12
Call-LT
3,603
0.16
Panel B: Moneyness Groups
N(days) Mean
Put-OTM
3,603
0.17
Put-ATM
3,603
0.37
Put-ITM
3,298
0.03
Call-OTM
3,603
0.01
Call-ATM
3,603
0.36
Call-ITM
3,571
0.07

SD
0.13
0.08
0.10
0.09
0.07
0.11

Min
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00

P25
0.12
0.11
0.12
0.10
0.07
0.07

P50
0.20
0.15
0.18
0.15
0.11
0.14

P75
0.31
0.21
0.25
0.22
0.16
0.23

Max
0.77
0.59
0.94
0.58
0.63
0.68

SD
0.11
0.15
0.04
0.01
0.16
0.06

Min
0.01
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

P25
0.09
0.27
0.01
0.00
0.24
0.02

P50
0.14
0.35
0.01
0.01
0.36
0.05

P75
0.22
0.45
0.03
0.01
0.46
0.09

Max
0.86
0.93
0.60
0.21
0.88
0.72
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Figure 1: Total Volume of SP500 Index Options of 2004-2018
This figure shows the total volume of SP500 Options for each month from 2004
to 2018. The data comes from Option Metrics. The red vertical lines represent event
months (listed below). More accurate event dates are listed in Appendix.
•
•
•
•

2005m10: introduction of SPX weeklys
2007m2: introduction of SPX quarterlys
2010m7: weeklys availability expands by 1 day
2010m12: weeklys transition: AM→ PM; open outcry → hybrid

•
•
•
•
•
•

2012m5: weeklys listing expanded (from 1 week) to 5 consecutive weeks
2014m1: weeklys listing expanded (from 5 weeks) to 8 consecutive weeks
2014m7: introduction of SPX End-of-Month Options (EOMs)
2014m9: weeklys listing expanded to 12 consecutive weeks from Sep-Dec 2014
2016m2: Introduction of SPX Wednesday-expiring weeklys
2016m8: Introduction of SPX Monday-expiring weeklys
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Figure 2: Trading Volume by Year
This figure demonstrates the year-by-year total trading volume for contracts in each (a) maturity and (b)
moneyness group. Group definitions are the same as in Table 1.

(a) Maturity Groups

(b) Moneyness Groups
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Figure 3: IS: 2004 VS. 2018
These pie charts present the comparison of information share (IS) in 2004 and 2018 for maturity groups (a and
b) and moneyness groups (c and d). Group definitions are the same as in Table 1.

(a) Maturity Groups: 2004

(c) Moneyness Groups: 2004

(d) Moneyness Groups: 2018

(b) Maturity Groups: 2018
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Figure 4: Conventional Measures by Year
This figure shows the year-by-year (a) average daily number of contracts and (b) average
daily
number of maturities per maturity and moneyness. Group definitions are the same as in
Table 1.

(a) Average Daily Number of Contracts by Year

(b) Average Daily Number of Maturities by Year
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Figure 5: IS by year
This figure demonstrates the year-by-year information share (IS) in each (a) maturity and
(b) moneyness group. Group definitions are the same as in Table 1.

(a) Maturity Groups

(b) Moneyness Groups
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Figure 6: IS Structural Changes
This figure demonstrates the year-by-year information share (IS) for (a) puts and calls,
and (b) long-term (LT), medium-term (MT) and short-term (ST) contracts. Group
definitions are the same as in Table 1. Vertical lines denote new options introduction:
• 2005: introduction of weeklys
• 2007: introduction of quarterlys
• 2010: weeklys transition: AM → PM; open outcry → hybrid
•
•
•

2012: expansion of weekly listing (from 1 week) to 5 consecutive weeks
2014: introduction of End-of-Months (EOMs); expansion of weekly listing to 12
consecutive weeks
2016: introduction of new weeklys (Monday and Wednesday expiration)

(a) Put vs. Call

(b) ST vs. MT vs. LT
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Figure 7 IS for old and new options
This figure presents information share (IS) evolution for old options (“Monthlys”) and
new options. The event years for new options are marked in red vertical lines:
•
•
•

2005: introduction of weeklys
2007: introduction of quarterlys
2010: weeklys transition: AM → PM; open outcry → hybrid

•
•

2012: expansion of weekly listing (from 1 week) to 5 consecutive weeks
2014: introduction of End-of-Months (EOMs); expansion of weekly listing to 12
consecutive weeks
2016: introduction of new weeklys (Monday and Wednesday expiration)

•
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Figure 8 Beta Regression: Effect of 1σ Change in x on IS
This Figure demonstrates the estimated marginal effect of 1σ change in each explanatory
variable on IS from 90 beta regressions of equation (8) (year-by-year regression for 15
years and 6 maturity groups). We only report marginal effects that are statistically
significant at 95% level the insignificant marginal effect is shown to be zero. See section
4.5.5 for variable definition.

(a) Puts

(b) Calls
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Appendix to Essay 3: Market Completion Process of SP500 Index Options
2005/10/28 Introduction of SPX (End-of-Week) weeklys
• CBOE History: https://www.cboe.com/about/history/
2007/02/21 Introduction of SPX End-of-Quarter options (quarterlys)
•

CBOE Information Circular: http://otp.investis.com/generic/sec/secshow.aspx?Type=pdf&haspdf=1&cik=0001374310&FilingId=5686685

2010/07/01 Weeklys availability expands by 1 day (listed on Thursday instead
of Friday) for trades' ease of roll-over.
•

CBOE press release: https://ir.cboe.com/news-and-events/2010/06-30-2010/cboeexpands-weekly-options-one-day-allows-traders-more-easily-roll-one-weeklyexpiration-another

2010/12/2 Weeklys transit from AM-settlement to PM-settlement (to reduce gap
risk) and from open outcry to hybrid trading (enabling both open outcry and
electronic trading).
•

CBOE Regulatory Circular:
http://www.cecouncil.com/media/2607/ae1ba790-4f87-4493-93cd3420d24683af.pdf
2012/05/31 Weeklys listing expanded (from 1 week) to 5 consecutive weeks.
•

CBOE Information Circular:
https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/regulation/circulars/general/IC-CBOE2012-093.pdf
2014 Jan Weeklys listing expanded (from 5 weeks) to 8 consecutive weeks
•

2014/07/07 Introduction of SPX End-of-Month Options (EOMs) CBOE
Regulatory Circular:
https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/regulation/circulars/regulatory/RG14081.pdf

2014 Sep-Nov Weeklys listing expanded (from 8 weeks) to 12 consecutive
weeks
2016/02/23 Introduction of SPX Wednesday-expiring Weeklys.
•

CBOE press release: https://ir.cboe.com/news-and-events/2016/02-012016/cboe-list-spx-wednesday-expiring-weeklys-options
2016/08/15 Introduction of SPX Monday-expiring Weeklys.
•

CBOE press release: https://ir.cboe.com/news-and-events/2016/07-112016/cboe-list-spx-monday-expiring-weeklys-options
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